



So long as manufactured goods reached the ultimate consumer with
the help of a single sales transaction, the producer's liability for defec-
tive goods did not present a special problem. A consumer worthy of
protection had at his disposal the two basic categories of civil liability:
contract and tort. The problem of his remedies, however, became acute
with the elongation of the process of manufacturing and distribution.
Both the common and the civil law have experienced difficulties in
finding ways of imposing direct liability on the manufacturer in favor
of the ultimate consumer or user. The imposition of direct contractual
liability was retarded, if not prohibited, by the privity principle de-
veloped and adhered to by the classical law of contracts everywhere. 1
t Sterling Professor of Law, Yale University. J.U.D. 1928, University of Berlin. The
author's background study of consumer protection under modem sales law appeared in
74 YALE LJ. 262 (1964).
The following abbreviations are used in this article for French and German codes,
reports, and periodicals:
AcP ARCHIv FOR DIE CMVILIST.SCHE PRAXMS
BGB German Bfirgerliches Gesetzbuch (C. Heymann 1965)
BGHZ Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofs in Zivilsachen (1951-date)
C. Crv. French Code Civil (58e ed. Petits Codes Dalloz 1957)
C. PRO. CMv. French Code de Proc~dure Civile (Codes Annotds Dalloz 1910)
D.H. Jur. Recueil Dalloz, Recueil Hebdomadaire de Jurisprudence (1924-
1940)
D. Jur. Recueil Dalloz (1945-1965)
D.P. Recueil Da~loz, Recueil Pdriodique et Critique (182-1940)
DR DEuTsca S REH
RECnr DAs Rrcnr
REv. Tpmr. D.C. REVUE TRIMESTRELLE DE DRorr CrIL
RGZ Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts in Zivilsachen (1880-1945)
Sem. Jur. La Semaine Juridique (also titled Juris.Claseur P!riodique)
(1927-date)
SeuffArch Seufferts Archiv fMr Entscheidungen der obersten Gerichte in den
deutschen Staaten (1847-1898)
S. Jur. Recueil Dalloz, Recueil Sirey (1791-1964) (titled Recueil Gdntral
de Lois et des Arrts-until 1950)
VEnsR V RSICHERUNGSRECHT. JUR. RUNDSCHAU FOR DIE INDIVIDUALIO5I.II-
ERUNG
ZDGHR ZErscHRIFT FOJR DAS GESAzn-E IENDLSECHT UND IIRTSOLCAS-
1. Langridge v. Levy, 2 M. & W. 519, 150 Eng. Rep. 863, 867 (E.. 1837); Boulton v. Jones.
2 H. & N. 564, 157 Eng. Rep. 232 (EL 1857); Boston Ice Co. v. Potter, 123 Mass. 28 (1877);
Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 622, 624, 185 P. 633, 634 (1913) (emphasizing exceptions);
Chyski v. Drake Bros. Co., 235 N.Y. 468, 472, 139 N.E. 576 (1923); Earl v. Lubbok, [L1905] I
K.B. 253; International Harvester Co. of Austi. v. Carrigan's Hazeldene Pastoral Co., 32
Ausm. L.J. REP. 160, 161 (1958); C. Civ. art. 1165 (F.); BGB § 305 (Ger.).
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The notion that strangers to a contract cannot sue on it was and, in
principle, is still widely regarded as a "vdritd de bon sens."'2 Contractual
transactions will become insecure and too burdensome if the debtor
has to take into account the interests of parties other than his own
creditor.3 Warranty liability in particular, supposedly anchored in a
sales contract, should accord protection only to the immediate buyer;
due to its strict character, it is "too severe to be extended freely."'1
Successive warranties accompanying a string of sales contracts have
been regarded under this approach as independent personal obliga-
tions, even where the express warranty of the first seller is reiterated in
successive salesY Understandably, the privity dogma has prevented
Continental literature speaks of the "relativity of contractual obligations." Wicacker,
Das Bilrgerliche Recht im Wandel der Gesellschaftsordnungen, in 2 HUNDERT JAIIII
DEUTSCHES RE HTSLEBEN 1, 15 (E. von Caemmerer, E. Friesenhaln, R. Lange cds. 1960).
See also B. LA7TA, SCHULDVERThAGLICHE BEZIEHUNGEN ZWISClKEN VERBRAUCIER UND HER.
STELLER 44 (Berlin Diss. 1961); 1 A. VON TUHR-A. SIEGWART, ALL.EMEINER TElL DES SCIWIE.
ZERISCHEN OBLIGATIONENRECHTS § 2 (1942); Savatier, Le prdtendu principe de l'effet relatif
des contrats, 33 REv. TRII. D.C. 525 (1934).
2. Capitant, Sur un traitd des obligations, 32 REV. TRt. D.C. 743, 746 (1933), review
of R. DEMOGUE, TRArIT DES OBLIGATIONS EN GtNtRAL (1933). The scope of the privity
principle is of great importance because, due to the predominance of a division of labor
in modem society, many transactions are interrelated. Most legal systems have been
cautious in tampering with it even indirectly (with the help of tort law) and have
frequentiy denied protection to "the foreseeable plaintiff." Otherwise, in the language of
Cardozo, "[t]he assumption of one relation will mean the involuntary assumption of a
series of new relations, inescapably hooked together." Moth co. v. Rensselaer Water Co.,
247 N.Y. 160, 168, 159 N.E. 896, 899 (1928). For a criticism of the case on both the legal
and the policy levels, see Seavey, The Waterworks Cases and Stare Decisis, 66 HARV. L.
1-V. 84 (1952), and the strong dissenting opinions of VanderbIt, C.J., and Heier, I.,
in Reiman v. Monmouth Consol. Water Co., 9 N.J. 134, 140, 154, 87 A.2d 325, 328, 34
(1952).
For the most recent discussion of the erosion of privity and the recovery of commercial
losses, see Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965), Seely v.
White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965), and Price v. Gatlin,
241 Ore. 315, 405 P.2d 502 (1965).
For the German law, see H.O. DE BooR, DIE KoLLsION VON FORDERUNGSREcITEN 84.35
(1928); F. KssLR, DI FAHRLXssIGKEIT i s NoRmDA1mAUKANiscaN DsLiKxSREAIT 104-10
(1932); von Caemmerer, Das Problem des Drittschadensersatzes, 127 ZFDGHR 241-43 (1965);
for the French law, see E. WAHL, VERTRAGSANSPRiC5IE DRIrrER II FRANZSISCIIEN RECIIT,
DARGESTELLT AN HAND DER FiLLE DER ACTION DiTEcTE 208-15 (1935).
3. This point has often been made in the German literature. E.g., 1 K. LARENZ, LEIRIUcit
DEs SCHuLDRECHTS § 14 HI (6th ed. 1963); TAEGERT, DIE GELTENMACHUNG DES DsItr c lAMNS
48 (1938).
4. Note, Necessity for Privity of Contract in Warranties by Representation, 42 HAy.
L. REV. 414, 415 (1929) (referring to absolute liability under common law); accord,
F. PoLLocK, TimE LAW OF TORTS 570 (13th ed. 1929). German law: 2 J.D. STAUDINGME
KOATMENTAR ZUM BORGERLICHEN GESETEBUCH § 433, Bem. 97a (11th ed. 1955); 1 S. WILLISTON,
SATES § 244 (rev. ed. 1948) (warranty is contract of personal indemnity). According to
German literature the aedilitian remedies (rescission or price diminution) are for prac-
tical reasons unavailable against the remote seller. Lxrr", supra note 1, 146, 147. In
our common law there are conflicting decisions as to the availability of warranty liability
against the manufacturer if the only injury suffered by the buyer is damage to the
goods sold. For liability, see Smith v. Platt Motors, Inc., 137 So. 2d 239 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1962), and note 120 infra.
5. Booth v. Scheer, 105 Kan. 643, 646-47, 185 P. 898, 900 (1919) (horse sold and resold
under same warranty): "The soundness of a horse is so much a matter of opinion, and
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direct recovery not only by a sub-purchaser, but also by the user who
was not a buyer.
Tort liability as a means of filling the gap was slow in coming, and
even when available had prerequisites of its own which hindered re-
covery. In the common law, for instance, courts were long reluctant to
recognize that by assuming a contractual obligation to a buyer, a seller
may also incur a duty to observe care for the protection of third parties.
Tort liability arising out of breach of contract was limited (at least in
the common law) by notions akin to privity.0 Indeed, it was, and in
many countries still is strongly influenced by the requirement that the
injury must be directly brought about by the tortfeasor.T To hold
otherwise, it was felt, might impose crushing burdens on the manu-
facturer.8 In addition, liability under classical tort law everywhere was
is so easily affected by change of care, or change of work, or of feed, water, or weather-
surely this does not yet need to be elaborated, for the generation of lawyers and judges
who are also experienced horsemen has not yet vanished-that it would never do to
extend or apply the doctrine of warranties of title, if that doctrine be well-founded, to
warranties of soundness to run with so changeable a form of property as a stallion."
The notion that warranties are personal undertakings has not been confined to chattels
subject to change. I S. WILuS-mN, SALES § 244 (rev. ed. 1948). But see the principal
case at 645.
6. IV. PRossER, HANDBOOK OF THE IAW OF TORTS 658 (3d ed. 1964) [hereinafter cited as
PROSSER ON Toms]. This notion was not foreign to German law. It was laid to rest by
Judgment of April 19, 1916, 60 GRUCHOTS BErnicE ZUR ERI UERUNG DES DEurscirN
REcHrs 1011 (Reichsgericht). See R. R.INHA DT, DER ESALTZ DES Dzrrsc tADE.s 97 (1933).
7. The privity doctrine was reinforced as it were by its corollary in tort law, the
notion that tort law protects only the person "directly injured" and not the person who,
because of a contractual relationship with the injured party, suffers damages. Stoljar,
The International Harvester Case: A Manufacturer's Liability for Defective Chattels,
32 AusrL. L.J. 307, 310 (1959), referring to the "revealing discussion" in Langridge v.
Levy, 2 M. & W. 519, 150 Eng. Rep. 863 (ER. 1837). See also Robins Dry Dock F Repair
Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303, 309 (1927). The impact of the direct injury principle in the civil
law is discussed in von Caemmerer, supra note 2, at 2, pointing out that the French law
seems to have taken a more "liberal" view. See also S. Snirrus, GRUN OFRCEN DER Pnonu-
ZENTENHAFrG 48 (1965).
Of course, both the privity and the direct injury principles have suffered erosions, and,
as a result, the line between liability and non-liability is wavering and blurred. For our
law, see 2 F. HARPER & F. JA.rES, TORTS § 18.6 (1956). Compare Donovan Const. Co. v.
General Electric Co., 133 F. Supp. 870 (D. Minn. 1955) (approved in 4 A. Conaix, Co.%nACrs
§779D n.74 (1964 Supp.), criticized in Comment, Manufacturer's Liabilily for Intangible
Harm, 8 STAN. L REv. 725 (1956)), with Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 26, 135 N.E. 275
(1922). See generally Comment, Foreseeability of Third.Party Economic Injuries, 20
U. Cm. L. REv. 283 (1953). Attempts to draw the line in terms of complete nonfeasance
as contrasted with misfeasance or the interests involved, are concededly of heuristic
value only. Seavey, supra note 2, at 84.
8. Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. & IV. 108, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842); Ketterer v.
Armour & Co., 200 F. 322, 323 (S.D.N.Y. 1912).
With regard to the argument that non-liability worked great hardship on the crippled
coachman, the court in Winterbottom had this to say: ". .. but that might have been
obviated by the plaintiff had he made himself a party to the contract." 152 Eng. Rep.
at 405.
How difficult it was to overcome the spirit of Winterbottom v'. Wright is illustrated
by the powerful policy statement of Sanborn, J., in Huset v. J.1. Case Threshing Mach. Co.,
120 F. 865, 867 (8th Cir. 1903): ".... [F]or the reason that a wise and conservative public
policy has impressed the courts with the view that there must be a fixed and definite
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predicated upon fault-an obstacle to recovery still existing in many
legal systems.9
Thus the principles of privity of contract, direct injury and fault
constituted and in many countries still constitute most important road-
blocks to full and direct recovery against the producer of goods which
cause injury. To be sure, common and civil law have always provided
for his indirect liability by a process of unraveling the chain of sales
backwards. 10 But this method of imposing liability often turns out to
be wasteful and may not even be available. The injured buyer's remedy
against his immediate seller is an empty right if the latter is insolvent.
And, in any case, successful unraveling depends on the intricacies of
the various sales laws with their prerequisites to liability (including the
possibility of disclaimer). 1 In addition, it may turn out to be a most
expensive procedure, since the cost of litigation may be grossly dis-
proportionate to the injury inflicted. 12 In those civil law countries
which have not completely succeeded in emancipating themselves from
the rules of the Roman law, the process of going back step by step has
limitation to the liability of manufacturers and vendors for negligence in the construc-
tion and sale of complicated machines and structures which are to be operated or used
by the intelligent and the ignorant, the skillful and the incompetent, the watchful and
the careless, parties that cannot be known to the manufacturers or vendors, and who
use the articles all over the country hundreds of miles distant from the place of their
manufacture or original sale, a general rule has been adopted and has become established
by repeated decisions of the courts of England and of this country that in these cases
the liability of the contractor or manufacturer for negligence in the construction or sale
of the articles which he makes or vends is limited to the persons to whom he is liable
under his contracts of construction or sale. The limits of the liability for negligence and
for breaches of contract in cases of this character are held to be identical." For the
misunderstanding of Winterbottom, see note 48 infra.
9. Brown v. Kendall, 6 Cush. 292 (Mass. 1850); O.W. HOLMEs, ThE ColMMoN LAw
77-82, 88-96 (Nf. Howe ed. 1963); Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the
Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499, 515-16 (1961); Keeton, Products Liability-The Nature
and Extent of Strict Liability, 1964 ILL. L.F. 693 (1964). The policy reasons for the
emergence and preponderance of the fault principle in our country during the nineteenth
and well into the twentieth century are discussed in Losee v. Buchanan, 51 N.Y. 476.
484-85 (1873), Calabresi, supra at 515-16, and Gregory, Trespass to Negligence to Absolute
Liability, 37 VA. L. REv. 358, 368 (1951). For the German law, see Wahl, Das Per-
schuldenprinzip im Kiinftigen Schadensersatzrecht, in GRUNDFRAGEN DER Rriow DrS
ScsI DENsERSATzaRcHTs 17 (Arbeitsberichte der Akademie fOr Deutsches Recht Nr. 14,
H. Nipperdey ed. 1940).
10. McSpeedon v. Kunz, 271 N.Y. 131, 2 N.E.2d 513 (1936); Randy Knitwear, Inc. v,
American Cyanamid Co., 11 N.Y.2d 5, 13-14, 181 N.E.2d 399, 403, 226 N.Y.S.2d 363,
369 (1962); Kasler v. Slavonski, [1928] 1 K.B. 78; W. PROSSER & Y. SMTH, CASES AND
MATEARLs ON TORTS 838-39 (3rd ed. 1962). For the possibility of vouching in, see
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-607(5)(a) [hereinafter cited as U.C.C.].
11. Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 11 N.Y.2d 5, 14, 181 N.E2d
399, 403, 226 N.Y.S.2d 363, 369 (1962); Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Lia-
bility to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1124 (1960). See Franklin, When Worlds
Collide: Liability Theories and Disclaimers in Defective-Products Cases, 18 STAN. L,
REv. 974, 985, 1017-18 (1966).
12. Kasler v. Slavonski, [1928] 1 K.B. 78, is frequently cited as a horrible example.




a further drawback in that the injured buyer is not given adequate
protection so long as his recovery against an "innocent" seller is
limited to the aedilitian remedies:13 the privilege to return defective
merchandise or to claim reduction of the purchase price does not
compensate him for harm done to his person or property.
The insulation of the manufacturer of defective goods against direct
liability dated back to a period when the factor "of personal relation-
ship loomed quite large in the consciousness of law courts." 14 With the
advent of mass production and large scale promotion and distribution
of goods the prevailing doctrine came under ever-increasing attack.
In the evolution of the producer's direct liability, the roles played
by tort and contract law respectively have varied considerably in the
different legal systems. Understandably, courts of all countries moved
along the line of least resistance, resorting principally to that brand of
civil liability which was flexible enough to permit recovery without too
radical a break with tradition and principle. Thus, some relied mainly
on tort law in order to escape the privity dogma while others have
adapted contract law to changing notions of social policy, supplement-
ing it with tort law. And yet, by and large, the notions underlying both
fields have suffered considerable modification under the impact of con-
siderations of public policy. Indeed, the distinction between the fields
-clearcut under classical doctrine-has been blurredY Hybrid forms
have developed where recovery is deemed essential for reasons of public
policy, but is not granted either by contract or tort law stricto s"nsit.10
Contract. In the evolution of the contract model, the privity require-
ment could not coexist with modem methods of marketing which
feature direct appeals to the consumer. Courts realized that individual
transactions, beginning with the first sale by the producer and ending
in the last sale to the consumer, are interrelated, not isolated. The
article is not meant to remain in the hands of the intermediate buyer,
who often is unable to control and inspect quality and who is typically
not the person to suffer injury.'7 Frequently, the merchandise bears a
13. Kessler, The Protection of the Consumer under Modern Sales Law, Part 1, 74
YA.E 1j. 262, 273-74 (1964).
14. Freeman v. Navarre, 47 Wash. 2d 760, 289 P.2d 1015, 1018 (1955).
15. Wieacker, Das BEirgerliche Recht, supra note 1, at 12.
16. Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 64, 207 A.2d 905. 311 (195);
accord, Montgomery v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 231 F. Supp. 447 (S.D.N.Y. 1964);
8 S. WLLsrON, CoNIIAcrs § 998A (3d ed. 1964); Jaeger, Product Liability: The Construe-
tive Warranty, 59 NoTRE DAmE LAwxan 501 (1964).
17. Bigelow v. Maine Central Ry., 110 Me. 105, 85 A. 396 (191); Thomas v. Win-
chester, 6 N.Y. 397, 409-10 (1852). The arguments advanced in the German literature offer
a striking parallel to those made in the Winchester case. Lxrr, supra note 1, at 55.
See also Stoljar, supra note 7, at 310.
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brand name and is not altered in successive sales transactions. It makes
little sense to apply the privity doctrine a outrance and flatly deny
protection by direct contract action to the injured consumer. "The
remedies of injured consumers . ..ought not to depend upon the
intricacies of the law of sales."' 8 Properly understood, privity is only a
means of protecting a party guilty of a breach against losses suffered by
remote parties which are unanticipated and therefore not included in
the calculation of costs.19
In their attack on the "citadel" of privity, with the help of the law
of contracts, American courts were most resourceful, more so than the
courts of other countries, although some of their contributions are
quite significant. 20 Aware of the techniques employed in modem mer-
chandising, our courts have tended to find wherever possible a direct
warranty running to parties other than the immediate purchasers.
Thus, an affirmation of quality prepared or authorized by the manu-
facturer and contained in purchase orders, factory warranties, "owner's
service certificates," catalogues, labels and even general advertisements
have been treated as express warranties running to the ultimate buyer
(who may be required to sign and mail an acceptance card).2 In this
process, the privity doctrine was subtly modified by distinguishing
between privity of sale and privity of contract. Some courts treated
devices soliciting trade as offers to warrant if the consumer will buy.2"
18. Ketterer v. Armour & Co., 200 F. 322, 323 (S.D.N.Y. 1912). This language has
often been repeated. See, e.g., Klein v. Duchess Sandwich Co., 14 Cal. 2d 272, 282, 93
P.2d 799, 804 (1939).
19. LATr, supra note 1, at 50.
20. See generally Prosser, supra note 11, at 1124; S. WILLxsrON, CONTRACTS §§ 99898B
(3d ed. 1964). For the German law, see LArr , supra note 1; Gernhuber, Haltung des
Warenherstellers nach Deutschem Recht, [1963] KARISRUHER FORusx 1; Lorenz, Warenabsalz
und Vertrauensschutz, id. at 8, 14. For the role of the living law made by English trade
associations, see the remarks of Scrutton, L.J., in James Finlay & Co. v. N.W. Kwlk Hoo
Tong Handel Mattschappij, [1929] 1 K.B. 400, 411-12.
21. 8 S. WILLISrON, CONTACtS § 998 (3d ed. 1964); 1 S. WILLISTON, SALES § 244a (rev.
ed. 1948); see, e.g., Lane v. C.A. Swanson & Sons, 130 Cal. App. 2d 210, 278 P.2d 723
(1955) (label and general advertising); State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Anderson-Weber,
Inc., 252 Iowa 1289, 110 N.V.2d 449 (1961); Bahlman v. Hudson Motor Car Co., 290
Mich. 683, 288 N.W. 309 (1939) (printed matter); Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. American
Cyanamid Co., 11 N.Y.2d 5, 181 N.E.2d 399, 226 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1962) (label), General
Motors Corp. v. Dodson, 47 Tenn. App. 438, 838 S.W.2d 655 (Ct. App. 1960) (factory
warranty); Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409 (1931); afl'd, 179 Wash.
123, 35 P.2d 1090 (1934); U.C.C. § 2-313, Comment 2; Annot., 88 A.L.R. 527 (1934) (fraud
in law) (catalogue of cases). Mere resale of an article to which the manufacturer has
affixed a warranty is not sufficient in itself to constitute an adoption by the seller. Orrison
v. Ferrante, 72 A.2d 771 (D.C. Mun. App. 1950); Cochran v. McDonald, 23 Wash, 2d 348,
161 P.2d 305 (1945). German merchandizing practices are described in P. ADOLFV, DER
RECHTSSCHUTZ DES KAUFERs BEI LIEFERUNG EINER FEHLERlArrEN SAMIE IN DER ARBEITSMILIOEN
WiasTscsHA-r 19, 51-52 (1961).
22. Timberland Lumber Co. v. Climax Mfg. Co., 61 F.2d 391 (3d Cir. 1932); Carlill v.
Carbolic Smoke Ball Co., [1893] 1 Q.B. 256; see Shanklin Pier Ltd. v. Detel Products Ltd.
[1951] 2 K.B. 854.
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Others dispensed with privity altogether, on the theory that "the basis
of warranty may be representation as well as contract;"23 thus market-
ing as such would be covered.24 Even the distinction between express
and implied warranties often insisted upon has become blurred if not
obliterated.2 5 The techniques used by American courts have been
closely followed in the German literature and may be responsible for
German interest in notions akin to representation, although German
case law until now has recognized direct contractual liability only in
the case of an express factory warranty. -° We find also in the German
literature the sensible distinction between advertised and anonymous
goods. The manufacturer of defective but anonymous goods, it is felt,
can hardly be subjected to direct contractual liability, since the con-
sumer was not misled by the manufacturer.
2-
To cut the privity doctrine back still further, the doctrines of agency,
third party beneficiary contract, and assignment were creatively em-
ployed. American courts sometimes dealt with the middleman as the
"agent" of the remote buyer; frequently he was treated as the agent of
the manufacturer, even in the teeth of a clause in the franchise or
warranty negating the dealer's agency status. The manufacturer thus
lost his freedom to control his risk by using the sales rather than the
agency system of distribution.28
Third party beneficiary notions were used by common and civil law
courts alike to give warranty protection to the consumer, members of
his household, and employees.29 German case law even developed a
new type of third party beneficiary contract differentiating between the
primary duty owed only to the promisee and the secondary duty of
careful performance owed to all persons affected by faulty performance
due to dose contact with performance.30 Of particular interest to an
23. 8 S. lVfUStoN, CoNTRAcrs § 998 (Sd ed. 1964); McCurdy, Warranty Priity in
Sales of Goods, 1 HoustoN L. Rxv. 201, 224, 225 (1954).
The action of deceit because of misleading advertising has often provided courts with
a handy tool for overcoming the privity requirement. See, e.g., Roberts v. Anheuser-
Busch Brewing Ass'n, 211 Mass. 449, 98 N.E. 95 (1912).
24. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63-64, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27
Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1963); Santor v. A. & M. Karagheusian, Inc., 44 NJ. 52, 65, 207 A.2d
305, 312 (1965). Price v. Gatlin, 241 Ore. 315, 323, 405 P.2d 502, 505 (1965). For a statute
aiming at consumer protection, see GA. CoDE AN. § 96-307, discussed in Patterson,
Manufacturer's Statutory Warranty: Tort or Contract? 10 MERcER L. REv. 272 (1959).
25. Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E.2d 612 (1958);
Markowitch v. McKesson & Robbins, 106 Ohio App. 265, 149 N.E2d 181 (1958).
26. Judgment of Jan. 17, 1940, 163 RGZ 21, 31-32.
27. LATrL, supra note 1, at 52-53.
28. Studebaker Corp. v. Nail, 82 Ga. App. 779, 62 S.E.2d 198 (1950).
29. Ward Baking Co. v. Trizzino, 27 Ohio App. 475, 161 N.E. 557 (1928). See generally
collection of cases in Jacob E. Decker & Sons, Inc. v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W.2d 828
(1942); 1 K. LARENz, supra note 3.
30. See note 171 and accompanying text infra.
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American reader may be the use sometimes made by French courts of
the notion of an (implied) assignment when resurrecting the often
discussed action directe running from the manufacturer to the con-
sumer 31-a development all the more remarkable in the light of argu-
ments advanced by Williston and the German Reichsgericht, who have
both maintained that the resale of defective goods does not as a rule
amount to an implied assignment of the remedy for defects.8 2 American
products liability law is, indeed, not without its functional counterpart
to the French action directe. Some American courts have redefined
privity as a "successive relationship in the same thing"8 3 and rather
daringly have resorted to the notion of a warranty running with the
goods.84 In doing this, they have borrowed notions developed in the
law of negotiable instruments and in real estate law, with its covenant
running with the land.3 5 Similar ideas occasionally can be found in the
civil and common law literature.30
It goes without saying that the potentialities inherent in the law of
contract and sales were lost on many courts.37 The force of tradition
expressed in the privity dogma prevented many courts in civil and
common law countries alike from allowing direct recovery in contract.
And even the most daring courts were forced to observe some of the
traditional limitations. The implied warranties of our sales law are
restricted in scope and subject to disclaimer.88 Protection, furthermore,
may be unavailable to the last buyer in a string of sales because the
chain of purchasers did not buy on the same terms throughout. 8 Under
31. See note 210 and accompanying text infra.
32. 8 S. WLLsTON, CONTRA TS § 998 (3d ed. 1964); Judgment of Feb. 25, 1915, 87 RGZ
1, 2, discussed in text at note 150 infra.
33. Peterson v. Lamb Rubber Co., 54 Cal. 2d 339, 347, 353 P.2d 575, 581, 5 Cal. Rptr.
863, 869 (1960).
34. Patargias v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 332 Ill. App. 117, 74 N.E.2d 162 (1947); Coca-
Cola Bottling Works v. Lyons, 145 Miss. 876, 111 So. 305 (1927); Ward v. Morehead
City Sea Food Co., 171 N.C. 33, 34, 87 S.E. 958 (1916); Patterson, The Apportionment of
Business Risks Through Legal Devices, 24 COLUbt. L. REy. 335, 358 (1924); Stoljar, supra
note 7, at 314.
35. See 2 AmmRIcAN LAiw OF PROPERTY § 9 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952); 1 R. Aic'mR, AY.
SMrri & S. TErr, CAsES ON PROPERTY 744-49 (1960). The implied warranty of title of the
seller of the chattel is, in contrast to civil law tradition, not treated as negotiable under
our law. Boyd v. Whitfield, 19 Ark. 447 (1858); Smith v. Williams, 117 Ga. 782, 45 S.E.
594 (1903).
36. Stoljar, supra note 7, at 314; KEsshrn, DiE FAHRLXssIKEIT, supra note 2, at 112
(1932).
37. E.g., Chysky v. Drake Bros. Co., 235 N.Y. 468, 472-73, 139 N.E. 576, 578 (1923).
38. Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 11 N.Y.2d 5, 14, 181 N.E.2d
399, 403, 226 N.Y.S.2d 363, 369 (1962). See also 79 HAv. L. Ray. 1315, 1317 (1966) (discus.
sing also the possibility of double recovery against the manufacturer). For the availability
of vouching in, see U.C.C. § 2-607(5); Degnan & Barton, Vouching to Quality Warranty:
Case Law and Commercial Code, 51 CALIF. L. Rav. 471 (1963).
39. Stoljar, supra note 7, at 309.
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the German law, to give a further illustration of the precarious position
of the buyer, an injured buyer is without a damage remedy under sales
law if the immediate seller was not guilty of negligent performance.40
Tort. Small wonder that the courts everywhere resorted to tort law to
free recovery from the intricacies of the law of sales. All progressive
systems of law have found acceptable the notion that a person's con-
duct may at once constitute nonperformance of a contractual duty and
the creation of an unreasonable risk of harm to others than those in
privity.41 But many legal systems have been unable to break with the
classic prerequisite of tort law, the minimum requirement of negli-
gence.42 To be sure, the consumer's protection under tort law has been
expanded in many systems by an inference or presumption of negli-
gence in the form of a res ipsa loquitur doctrine or otherwise.4 3 But
many a consumer has suffered defeat because he could not sustain the
burden of proving negligence, or because of an affirmative showing of
proper care on the part of the manufacturer.4
To overcome these shortcomings of tort law (supposed or real), legal
systems such as our own have moved in the direction of strict liability.
Other legal systems which have found such a step too drastic have been
put under increasing pressure to stretch conventional notions of con-
tract law whenever possible, or even to invent new modes of liability.
The Technical Solutions in Detail
The American Case Law
American case law, particularly during the last decade, has been truly
ingenious in giving the consumer or user recovery for injuries caused
by defective goods. The dramatic story of this development, mostly in
40. BGB §§ 459, 462; Kessler, The Protection of the Consner, supra note 13, at 275-76.
41. Chysky v. Drake Bros. Co., 235 N.Y. 468, 473, 139 N.E. 576, 578 (1923); Peters v.
Johnson, Jackson & Co., 50 IV. Va. 644, 41 S.E. 190 (1902); Donoghue v. Stevenson, [1932]
A.C. 562; F. PoLLocK, ToRrs 567-68 (13th ed. 1929).
42. This is true not only for the German, but also for the English law. Donoghue v.
Stevenson, [1932] A.C. 562, 622.
43. Prosser, supra note 11, at 1114-15. For the English law, see, e.g., Grant v. Australian
Knitting Mills Ltd., [1936] A.C. 85; Mason v. Williams, Ltd., [1955] 1 All E.R. 803, 810.
Under German law the manufacturer has the burden of proof with regard to careful
selection and supervision of his employees. The German counterpart to res iprn loquitur
is the Beweis des ersten Anscheins. See generally 0. PALANDr, BOUnReERLcls GEsrrzulC
Vorbem. 8 vor § 249, § 823 Bern. 13 (22d ed. 1963). As to its usefulness, see text after note
139 infra.
44. This is particularly true for the German law. 2 H. Somr.L--W. SMuront, MMr-
LIJcHs GEsEmzBucH § 823 Bern. 498 (9th ed. 1962). For our law see the observations of
Traynor, J., concurring in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d
436, 440-44 (1944). See also Jaffe, Res Ipsa Loquitur Vindicated, 1 BurFrALo L. Rrx. 1, 12, 13
(1951).
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the law of torts, has often been told in recent years .4 Therefore, only
the high points of the evolution of our law will be recapitulated so as
to permit a comparison with other legal systems.
Negligence Liability. The rapid pace in the recent evolution of our
law toward strict enterprise liability is all the more remarkable when
we consider the quietist attitude taken by most common law courts for
three-quarters of a century, following the "landmark" decision in
Winterbottom v. Wright.46 The reasoning and philosophy of the case,
which took the fault principle for granted, expressed strong sentiments
of public policy. It was therefore broadly interpreted. Not only did it
lend strength to the principle that "facts which constitute a contract
cannot have any other legal effect," 47 but for a long time it was also
misunderstood to mean that the manufacturer or seller is not liable to
a remote purchaser or user for harm caused "even by lack of care on
his part in putting out the product.
'48
However powerful the inclination "to throw a strong arm of protec-
don around the manufacturer warding off claims of third parties not
direct purchasers," 49 a counter-current reflecting profound changes in
social policy was inevitable. Tort liability appeared rather early (at least
in this country) in situations where the injury was caused by chattels
"inherently dangerous to life or health" (such as poisons, explosives
and deadly weapons); it was daringly extended to cover all negligently
made products. 0 Protection under a broad rule came to be accorded
to those not in privity "who will foreseeably use or be exposed to the
use of such products and will probably be hurt by them if they are
negligently constructed, handled or repaired."6 1 This development was
45. E. LEV, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 9-27 (1961 ed.); Prosser, supra
note 11. The literature is collected in 8 S. WILLIsroN, CONTRACTS § 998 n.18 (3d ed. 1964).
46. 10 M. & W. 108, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842).
47. F. POLLOCK, Tors 570 (13th ed. 1929).
48. H. SHULMAN & F. JAZES, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF TORTS 722 n,1
(2d ed. 1952). For the true meaning of the Winterbottom case, see Donoghue v. Stevenson,
[1932] A.C. 562, 588-89; F. POLLOCK, TORTS 570 (13th ed. 1929); Bohlen, Liability of
Manufacturers to Persons Other Than Their Immediate Vendees, 45 L.Q. REv. 843 (1929).
The Winterbottom rule is still applied in the "mere" nonperformance (of a contract) as
contrasted with misperformance situations. See, e.g., Waters v. Anthony, 252 Ala. 244,
40 So. 2d 316 (1949); Hanson v. Blackwell Motor Co., 143 Wash. 547, 255 P. 939 (1927)
(illustrating the arbitrariness of a mechanical distinction). See also W. PROSSER, SELCrr
TOPICaS ON THE LAW OF TORTS 380, 387 (1953); authorities cited note 2 supra.
49. Simmons Co. v. Hardin, 75 Ga. App. 420, 425, 43 S.E.2d 553, 557 (1948).
50. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916). Cases illustrat-
ing the confusing nature of the inherently dangerous chattels category are collected in
PROSSER & SMNITH, supra note 10, at 808-09.
51. C. GREGORY & H. KALVEN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS, 290-91 (1959); see
Carter v. Yardley & Co., 319 Mass. 92, 64 N.E.2d 693 (1940). For recent cases illustrating
the wide range of negligence liability, see Pitts v. Basile, 55 Ill. App. 2d 37, 204 N.E.2d
43 (1965) (failure of rack distributor of darts to use reasonable care in marketing);
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accompanied and reinforced by a constant extension of duties to use
reasonable care and skill in the adoption of a safe plan or design, 2 and
of duties to test, to warn and to give directions to prevent unsafe use.0
After some hesitation liability for negligence was broadened to cover
property damage,54 but direct liability for mere economic loss is still
unsettled. 55
The philosophy underlying this extension of negligence liability
was forcefully expressed by Mr. Justice Jackson in his dissenting opin-
ion in Dalehite v. United States:
... This is a day of synthetic living, when to an ever increasing
extent our population is dependent upon mass producers for its
food and drink, its cures and complexions, its apparel and gadgets.
These no longer are natural or simple products but complex
ones whose composition and qualities are often secret. Such a de-
pendent society must exact greater care than in more simple days
and must require from manufacturers or producers increased in-
tegrity and caution as the only protection of its safety and well-
being. Purchasers cannot try our drugs to determine whether they
kill or cure. Consumers cannot test the youngster's cowboy suit
or the wife's sweater to see if they are apt to burst into fatal flames.
Carriers, by land or by sea, cannot experiment with the combusti-
bility of goods in transit. Where experiment or research is neces-
Beadles v. Servel Inc., 344 Ill. App. 133, 100 N.E.2d 405 (1951) (protection of secondhand
buyer).
52. 2 RESTATE SENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 398 (1965). The manufacturer of a cosmetic
or drug must keep abreast of medical knowledge. E.g., Braun v. Roux Distrib. Co., 312
S.V.2d 758 (Mo. 1958). There is a duty to recall goods which turn out to be defective after
sale, see Comstock v. General Motors Corp., 358 Mich. 163, 99 NAV.2d 627 (1959), and
even a tendency to impose a continuing duty to provide safety devices developed after
the sale. Noel v. United Aircraft Corp., 342 F.2d 232 (3d Cir. 19653) (alternative holding).
But see Day v. Barber-Colman Co., 10 IIL. App. 2d 494, 508, 135 N.E.2d 231, 238 (1956)
(no duty to "adopt every new device which might possibly have been conceived or
invented'). Where the defect is known or obvious, the user, we are frequently told,
is not in need of protection. Campo v. Scofield, 301 N.Y. 468, 95 N.E.2d 802 (1950). But
see Wagner v. Larsen, 136 NAV.2d 312 (Iowa 1965); Schipper v. Levitt &t Sons, Inc., 44
NJ. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965); 2 F. HARPER & F. JAmEs, ToRTs § 28. (1956). For the diffi-
culties encountered in the development of the negligent design concept, see Katz,
Liability of Automobile Manufacturers for Unsafe Design of Passenger Cars, 69 Hnv. L.
REv. 863 (1956); O'Connell, Taming the Automobile, 58 Nw. L. REV. 299, 370 (1963). For
the English law, see H. STRT, TORTS 172 (3d ed. 1962).
53. E.g., Blitzstein v. Ford Motor Co., 288 F.2d 738 (6th Cir. 1961). See generally
Dillard &t Hart, Product Liability: Directions for Use and the Duty to Warn, 41 VA. L.
R-v. 145 (1955); Noel, Manufacturer's Negligence of Design or Directions for Use of a
Product, 71 YALE L.J. 816 (1962); Noel, Recent Trends in Manufacturers' Negligence as
to Design, Instructions or Warnings, 19 Sw. I.J. 43 (1965).
54. E.g., C.D. Herne, Inc. v. R.C. Tway Co., 294 S.W.2d 534 (Ky. 1956).
55. The same is true for direct liability for damage to the defective product itself.
See text at notes 117-31 infra; Note, Economic Loss in Products Liability Jurisprudence,
66 CoLum. L. Ray. 917 (1966); Comment, Products Liability-The Expansion of Fraud,
Negligence and Strict Tort Liability, 64 Mscsr. L. Rnv. 1350, 1357 (1966).
For a careful analysis of the "types of harm" which are recoverable in an action based
on negligence, see Franklin, supra note 11, at 980-86.
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sary to determine the presence or the degree of danger, the product
must not be tried out on the public, nor must the public be ex-
pected to possess the facilities or the technical knowledge to learn
for itself of inherent but latent dangers. The claim that a hazard
was not foreseen is not available to one who did not use foresight
appropriate to his enterprise. 346 U.S. 15, 51-52 (1953).
A parallel process of widening the producer's liability to persons not
in privity took place in warranty law, profoundly affecting the scope
and meaning of express as well as implied warranties.51'
Strict Liability. The relentless erosion of classical tenets made a
further transformation of products liability almost inevitable.67 Fre-
quently backed by the powerful argument that each enterprise should
pay its own way, 8 strict (enterprise) liability has begun to exercise
strong appeal. 9 Indeed, to many a court its adoption and the attendant
removal of both privity and negligence seemed but a culmination of
tendencies within sales and tort law clamoring for open recognition
and synthesis.60 Warranty liability, no longer confined to sales trans-
actions, 61 made its contribution to the process of merger by reminding
56. On express warranties see note 21 supra. Extended protection of persons not in
privity by implied warranties began with, but could not be confined to, food cases. E.g.,
Klein v. Duchess Sandwich Co., 14 Cal. 2d 272, 93 P.2d 799 (1939); Ryan v. Progressive
Grocery Stores, Inc., 255 N.Y. 388, 175 N.E. 105 (1931); Continental Copper &i Steel Indus,
Inc. v. E.C. "Red" Cornelius, Inc., 104 So. 2d 40 (Fla. App. 1958) (commercial loss), Spence
v. Three Rivers Bldrs. & Masonry Supply, Inc., 353 Mich. 120, 90 N.W.2d 873 (1958);
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960) (privity twice
removed). Since warranty liability is strict liability, the removal of privity paved the
way for strict liability to the consumer or user.
57. On the inevitability of the process, see PROSSER ON TORTS, supra note 6, at 672-73.
Sometimes the imposition of strict liability was no more than a dictum. E.g., Greenman
v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897 (1963) (negligence). The strong
language of strict liability used in many cases should not obscure the fact that typically
the defect is caused by somebody's fault; there was either a faulty design, or the manu-
facturing process was not up to required standards of care. Strict liability, therefore,
is frequently vicarious liability of the manufacturer to whose plant the defect can be
traced. The frequent "confusion" of warranty and negligence concepts is, therefore,
not surprising. Comment, Cigarettes and Vaccine: Unforseeable Risks in Manufacturers'
Liability Under Implied Warranty, 63 CoLum. L. REv. 515, 530 n.77 (1963).
58. See note 240 and accompanying text infra.
59. The much discussed case of Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358,
161 A.2d 69 (1960), constitutes the turning point; its significance has justly been com-
pared with Cardozo's famous opinion in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382,
IIl N.E. 1050 (1916), expounding negligence liability. See Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel
(Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. Rev. 791, 792 (1966). This article also gives
a list of the jurisdictions following the Henningsen rule. Id. at 793-99.
60. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944) (concurring
opinion), discussed in text at note 240 infra.
61. Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 446.56, 212 A.2d
769, 775-81 (1965) (continuing implied warranty of fitness imposed on lessor of truck to
protect employees of lessee); accord, Delaney v. Townmotor Corp., 339 F.2d 4 (2d Cir.
1964); 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMEs, TORTS § 28.19 (1956); Farnsworth, Implied Warranties of
Quality in Non-Sales Cases, 57 CoLltf. L. Ry. 653 (1957). For an interesting attempt to
work out the "transactional" limitations of warranty liability, see Gagne v. Bertram,
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courts that sellers of defective goods are, on principle, strictly account-
able for injuries to remote parties anyhow, if only by indirection. 2 In
tort law itself, despite the victory of the fault principle during the
nineteenth century, pockets of strict liability have continued to survive
or were revived, such as liability for ultrahazardous activities,0a vicari-
ous liability64 and responsibility for unwholesome food 05-- areas all
capable of expansion. Even in parts of the law dominated by tile negli-
gence requirement, strict liability was approached, if not achieved, by
a constant tightening of the standards of care"0 and by a liberal, if not
over-generous application of res ipsa loquitur."7 Finally, to give the
43 Cal. 2d 481, 275 P.2d 15 (1954), discussed in Macaulay, Justice Traynor and the Law of
Contracts, 13 STAN. L. REV. 812, 847 (1961). In France, a parallel development appears to
have taken place in the form of an extension of the so-called "obligation de securit.,"
which aims at the protection of parties to a contract against (physical) risks inherent in
nonperformance. See, e.g., Tripault et dame Brdzillon v. Soc. Cadoricin, [1957] S. Jur.
105 (Cour d'appel, Paris), aflfd, [1959] Sem. Jur. II 11159 (Cass. civ. 2e) (liability of
beautician and manufacturer of Cadoricin for skin rash caused to plaintiff.customer).
See generally H. Fi.R, DiE ScsADENSERSAI'PFLI cr DES VEPXXUFERS UND SEINER VOCFMAN-
NER BEI SACHMiXNGEU IN DER FRANZ6SISC-EN RECHISPRECIIUNG 86, 96 (1962).
62. Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 11 N.Y.2d 5, 14, 181 N.E.2d
399, 403, 226 N.YS.2d 363, 369 (1962).
63. The analogy between ultrahazardous activities and the manufacture of defective
goods, e.g., 2 RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment m (1965), is by no
means compelling. Noel, Strict Liability of Manufacturers, 50 A.B.A.J. 446, 448 (1964).
64. James, An Evaluation of the Fault Concept, 32 TENN. L. R V. 395, 396 (1963).
The increasing tendency to hold the assembler liable for the negligence of his supplier is
discussed in 2 F. HARPER & F. JAms, ToRTS § 28.28 (1956); see 2 RmSrAT EM.',-r (SECONM)
OF TORTS § 400 (1965).
65. In response to widespread public sentiment, strict liability appeared rather early
in food and drink cases where case law, in the name of public policy, accorded protection
to the consumer not in privity either by reviving the ancient warranty of wholesomeness
or by tightening the duty of care imposed on the seller of food. Parks v. C.C. Yost Pie
Co., 93 Kan. 334, 144 P. 202 (1914) (manufacturer or dealer "practically must know if
it is fit or take the consequences if it proves destructive'); Greenberg .. Lorenz, 9 N.Y.2d
195, 173 N.E.2d 773, 213 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1961); Jacob E. Decker & Sons, Inc. v. Capps, 139
Tex- 609, 164 S.V.2d 828 (1947); Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 6-2, 135 P. 633
(1913) (commercial loss, warranty); see Bryer v. Rath Packing Co., 221 Bid. 105, 156
A.2d 442 (1959).
66. Trowbridge v. Abrasive Co., 190 F.2d 825 (3d Cir. 1951) (failure to use testing
device which has been employed in other industries); La Plant v. LI. Du Pont de
Nemours & Co., 346 S.W.2d 231 (Mo. 1961); Braun v. Roux Distrib. Co., 312 S.W.2d
758 (Mo. 1958); Keeton, Recent Decisions and Developments in the Law of Products
Liability, 32 INs. COUNSEL J. 620, 620-23 (1965). For the English counterpart of this
attitude, see Mason v. Williams, Ltd., [1955] 1 All E.R. 808, 810 (chisel too hard); Davie
v. New Merton Board Mills, Ltd., [1959] A.C. 604, 620, [1959] 1 All E.R. 346, 351.
67. E.g., Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944); Evangelio
v. Metropolitan Bottling Co., 339 Mass. 177, 158 N.EX2d 342 (1959) (plaintiff not required
to exclude every possible cause for injury other than that of negligence). It has often
been emphasized that strict liability does not go much beyond negligence aided by res
ipsa loquitur. ".Where the action is against the manufacturer of the product, an honest
estimate might very well be that there is not one case in a hundred in which strict
liability would result in recovery where negligence does not." Prosser, supra note 11,
at 1114.
There is a substantial body of case law in which negligence was inferred from creditable
evidence of a defect. Keeton, Recent Decisions, supra note 66, at 623.27, 634. See also
Jaeger, How Strict is Manufacturer's Liability? Recent Developments, 48 BfLnQ. L REV.
293, 294-95 (1965); Keeton, Products Liability-Proof of the Manufacturer's Negligence, 49
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injured party the best of all possible worlds, the tort character of re-
sponsibility for quality was often emphasized, encouraged by the happy
circumstance that warranty liability had never lost its tort character
altogether.68 In this fashion, aspects of warranty liability, such as priv-
ity, disclaimer clauses, and the prerequisites of reliance and notice were
bypassed whenever they were regarded as obnoxious or unfair.0 (This
development in turn has encouraged, if not forced, modern sales law
to modernize its pertinent provisions and to make them more flexi-
ble.)70 The emergent new type of liability thus benefited from the
contribution of both branches of law.
The advent of strict liability was accompanied by a constant broad-
ening of the concept of defective product. It came to include not only
goods whose defects are caused by a miscarriage of the manufacturing
process (the traditional defective product), but products which are
unreasonably dangerous because of their design or composition.71
Furthermore, a product not inherently defective will be treated as
defective if its use has caused harm because of improper directions or
VA. L. REv. 675 (1963); Keeton, Products Liability-Some Observations about Allocation
of Risks, 64 MicH. L. Rxv. 1329, 1331 (1966); Note, Strict Products Liability and the By.
stander, 64 COLUM. L. Rav. 916, 921 (1964); Comment, Products Liability-The Expan.
sions of Fraud, Negligence and Strict Tort Liability, 64 MIcH. L. REv. 1350, 1362-68
(1966). For a sophisticated approach to the control test, see Ryan v. Zweck-Wollenbcrg
Co., 266 Wis. 630, 64 N.W.2d 226 (1954).
68. PROSSER ON TORTS, supra note 6, at 651. Warranties grew out of the action of
deceit, the use of which until Pasley v. Freeman, 3 T.R. 51, 100 Eng. Rep. 450 (K..,
1789), "was limited to cases of direct transactions between the parties. . . ." With the
Pasley case it came to be recognized that deceit was "not necessarily founded upon a
contract." PROSSER ON TORTS at 699. The old action of deceit thus was one of the most
striking instances of the early recognition of culpa in contrahendo in the common law.
On culpa in contrahendo, see Kessler & Fine, Culpa in Contrahendo, Bargaining in
Good Faith, and Freedom of Contract: A Comparative Study, 77 HARv. L. REv. 401 (1964).
69. Greeno v. Clark Equip. Co., 237 F. Supp. 427 (N.D. Ind. 1965); Greenman v.
Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963). These and
many other opinions make abundantly clear that strict tort liability was invented to
extend the strict law of warranty to consumers not in privity without giving the manu-
facturer the benefit of warranty law with its pitfalls for the unwary consumer. Shanker,
Strict Tort Theory of Products Liability and the Uniform Commercial Code: A Commen-
tary on Jurisprudential Eclipses, Pigeonholes and Communication Barriers, 17 W. Rrs. L.
Rmr. 5, 19 (1965).
70. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 NJ. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960): U.C.C.
§§ 2-316(2) to (3), 2"607(3), 2-719.
71. The distinction is still preserved in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TOLTS (1965) (com-
pare § 398 with § 402A), apparently to accommodate tie courts which are not prepared
to go all the way. Since the latter section goes beyond the former and covers both
classes of cases, a court adopting the broad principles of strict liability laid down in
§ 402A will have to impose strict liability to the user of a chattel "made under a plan
or design which makes it dangerous." Id. at § 398.
It is not always possible to say whether we are dealing with a faulty design or mls-
carriage of manufacturing situation. E.g., Putman v. Erie City Mfg. Co., 338 F.2d 911
(5th Cir. 1964); Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal.
Rptr. 896 (1964).
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inadequate warning.72 Even unforeseeability of harm, given the state
of available knowledge, has, occasionally, not afforded an excuse from
liability.73 And assemblers have not been excused simply because they
bought from otherwise reliable suppliers and were not negligent in
inspecting.7 4 Strict liability is therefore far more than negligence lia-
bility in disguise.
75
Second thoughts are occasionally voiced about the nature, outer
limits and social desirability of products liability. Not only has the
fault principle found new and thoughtful defenders,70 but even when
strict liability has been accepted as basically sound, many searching
questions have been raised which have not all received satisfactory
answers. Since these questions deal with issues which go to the very
heart of products liability, their treatment in detail will have to wait
for discussion of the policy bases of strict liability.77 But the issues
raised must be briefly summarized here, as they provide the framework
within which the future development of products liability will take
place.
Time and again, these questions have been asked: How strict is
strict liability?78 Should the economic feasibility of improving a prod-
uct constitute the outer limit of liability?70 Cases involving new drugs
and tobacco products, in particular, have raised the problem whether
the manufacturer should have to pay when at the time of marketing
72. Crane v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 218 Cal. App. 2d 855, 32 Cal. Rptr. 754 (1963);
La Plant v. Ef. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 346 SAV.2d 231 (Mo. 1961) (mislabelling).
73. Gottsdanker v. Cutter Laboratories, 182 Cal. App. 2d 602, 6 Cal. Rptr. 320 (1960);
Green v. American Tobacco Co., 154 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 1963); see note 258 infra.
74. Ford Motor Co. v. Mathis, 322 F.2d 267 (5th Cir. 1963); Vandermark v. Ford
Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964); REsrATEN-r (SEcoND)
OF ToRes § 400 (1965). Contra, Pabon v. Hackensack Auto Sales, Inc., 63 N.J. Super. 476,
164 A.2d 773 (App. Div. 1960) (assembler required only to exercise reasonable precaution by
means of inspection).
75. On the advantages of strict tort liability, see Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manu-
facturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5, 11, 13 (1965); Note, Products Liability and the Choice of Law,
78 HARV. L. Rav. 1452, 1453 (1965).
Occasionally, "use plus injury" has been equated with prima fade liability. Bronson
v. J.L. Hudson Co., 376 Mich. 98, 135 N.W.2d 388 (1965); see Henningscn v. Baloomfield
Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 696 (1960). Contra, Hanrahan v. Walgren Co., 243
N.C. 268, 90 S.E.2d 392 (1955). See generally Keeton, Products Liability-Some Observa.
tions, supra note 67, at 1339-43.
76. Plant, Strict Liability of Manufacturers for Injuries Caused by Defects in Products
-An Opposing View, 24 TE-NN. L. REv. 938 (1957); Smyser, Products Liability and the
American Law Institute: A Petition for Rehearing, 42 U. Drr. IJ. 343, 345.46 (1905).
See generally W. BLUM & H. KALVEN, PUBLIC LAW PmaSPECrmvas ON A PRIVATE LAW PR-n
LES (1965).
77. See text at note 240 infra.
78. Jaeger, supra note 67, at 293; Lascher, Strict Liability in Tort for Defectie,
Products: The Road to and past Vandermark, 38 S. CAL. L. REv. 30, 47 (1985); Speidel,
The Virginia "Anti-Privity Statute": Strict Products Liability Under the Uniform Coin.
mercial Code, 51 VA. L. REV. 804, 825 (1965).
79. Gossett v. Chrysler Corp., 359 F.2d 84 (6th Cir. 1966).
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"no developed human skill and foresight" could insure safety.80 The
steady rise in allergy litigation has dramatized the issue to what extent
the manufacturer should be able to protect himself by adequate warn-
ing.81 The availability of insurance (products liability, workmen's
compensation, accident insurance) has altered theories of enterprise
liability.82 The emergence of strict liability has invited courts and
scholars to develop a workable theory for determining the party best
able to gather and distribute risk. Recent case law has shown the need
for giving more precise meaning to the standard answer that liability
should be placed on the dominant party.8 3 The search for a refined
theory of dominance has reopened the issue of the social desirability
of holding the middleman strictly liable.8 4 Finally, questions have been
raised as to the desirability of a distinction between physical and mere
intangible (commercial) harm,85 and as to the availability of disclaim-
ers.86 Small wonder that the suitability of case law to cope with these
issues has been put in question.
82
Further complications have been added by the Restatement (Second)
80. This formula has repeatedly been used in tobacco cases. E.g., Green v. American
Tobacco Co., 304 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1952). For representative tobacco cases, see, in addi-
tion to the Green case, Lartigue v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir,
1963) (liability predicated on foreseeability of harmfulness, based on state of human
knowledge); Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1961) (mer-
chantability). For the subsequent history of the case, see Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers
Tobacco Co., 350 F.2d 479 (3d Cir. 1965).
For a discussion of the cigarette cases, see Rossi, The Cigarette-Cancer Problem: Plain-
tiffs Choice of Theories Explored, 34 S. CAL. L. Rv. 399 (1961); Comment, Cigarettes
and Vaccine: Unforeseeable Risks in Manufacturers' Liability Under Implied Warranty,
63 COLUM. L. Rav. 515 (1963); Note, 42 N.C.L. REv. 468 (1964); Note, 112 U. PA. L. REv.
620 (1964).
The most famous drug case is Gottsdanker v. Cutter Laboratories, 182 Cal. App. 2d
602, 6 Cal. Rptr. 320 (1960) (liability of manufacturer of Salk vaccine causing polio on
implied warranty, although jury found manufacturer not negligent; no warranty, how-
ever, that vaccine would grant immunity). For discussions of the case, see Comment,
supra, 63 COLUm. L. REv. 515 (1963); Note, The Cutter Polio Vaccine Incident: A Case
Study of Manufacturer's Liability Without Fault in Tort and Warranty, 65 YALE L.J.
262 (1955); 13 STAN. L. REv. 645 (1961). See generally Rheingold, Products Liability-The
Ethical Drug Manufacturer's Liability, 18 RUTGERs L. Rev. 947 (1964).
81. Magee v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 214 Cal. App. 340, 29 Cal. Rptr. 322 (1963)
(negligent disregarding of warning by physician is unforeseeable by manufacturer who
is, therefore, exempted from liability). For a collection and discussion of allergy cases,
see id. at 353, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 329.
82. A. EHRENZWEIG, NEGLIGENCE WITHOUT FAULT 29-30, 81 (1951). For the suggestion
that easy availability of flight insurance at low cost should have a bearing on liability
in an airplane fatality, see Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 438,
191 N.E.2d 81, 84, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592, 596 (1963).
83. In the recent case of Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432,
191 N.E.2d 81, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1963), majority and minority disagreed on this very issue,
For a discussion of the case see text accompanying notes 286-92 infra.
84. Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 37 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896
(1964); 1 WILLISTON, SALES §§ 233, 237a (rev. ed. 1948).
85. See text accompanying notes 121-32 infra.
86. See text accompanying notes 268-84 infra.
87. Smyser, supra note 76, at 351-52; Plant, supra note 76.
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of Torts and the Uniform Commercial Code. Both deal with products
liability, and their provisions overlap. The warranties of quality enu-
merated in the Code8 are broad enough to allow recovery for defects
which make a product "unreasonably dangerous" to the person or
property of the consumer or user-the criterion used by the Restate-
ment of Torts.8 9 A product which does not measure up to the quality
"contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchased it with the
ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its characteris-
tics"90 is unmerchantable.91 The Code protects the buyer of a defective
product not only against commercial injury but also against injuries to
his person or property "proximately resulting from the breach of a
warranty. " 92 It is thus not possible to divide the jurisdictions of Restate-
ment and Code by assigning consumer protection against physical
injury to the former while leaving the task of protecting the commer-
cial buyer and his purely economic losses to the latter.03 Nor is it the
function of the Uniform Commercial Code simply to protect a buyer
in privity by warranty law, or of the Restatement simply to protect
remote parties against physical injuries. The Restatement rule applies
88. U.C.C. §§ 2-313 to -315. It will not do to disregard the U.C.C., as the Illinois
Supreme Court has done in Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182
(1965).
89. § 402A SPECIAL LIABILITY OF SELLER OF PRODUCT FOR PHYSICAL
HARM TO USER OR CONSUMER
1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to
liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or con-
sumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product,
and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and
sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or en-
tered into any contractual relation with the seller.
90. RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) oF ToRmS, § 402A, comment i at 352 (1965).
91. In the language of a most recent case, "it may fairly be said that the liability
which [Restatement, section 402A] would impose is hardly more than what exists under
implied warranty when stripped of the contract doctrines of privity, disclaimer, require-
ments of notice of defect, and limitation through inconsistencies with express war-
ranties." Greeno v. Clark Equip. Co., 237 F. Supp. 427, 429 (N.D. Ind. 19135).
It goes without saying that not all unmerchantable goods are unreasonabl. dangerous.
In most consumer products liability cases the warranties of merchantability and of
fitness will be synonymous. Santor v. A. & M. Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 64-65, 207
A.2d 305, 311 (1965); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 35S, S4, 161 A.2d
69, 83-84 (1960); Ryan v. Progressive Grocery Stores, Inc., 255 N.Y. 388, 392, 175 N.E.
105, 106 (1931).
92. U.C.C. §§ 2-714(3), 715(2)(b). For a possible conflict between recovery under the
Restatement and the U.C.C., see Franklin, supra note 11, at 999, 1000.
93. See note 127 and accompanying text infra.
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to immediate as well as remote parties,04 and the Code protects "any
natural person who is in the family or household of [the] buyer or who
is a guest in his home if it is reasonable to expect that such person may
use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is injured in person
by a breach of the warranty."95 The Code, we are told, is neutral with
regard to remote parties who do not fall into this category, and a com-
ment makes quite clear that section 2-318 is not intended either to
enlarge or to restrict the developing case law on how far an original
seller's warranty extends.90 But although the Code and the Restatement
may agree in the desirability of according protection to remote parties,
the drafters of the Code clearly contemplate extensive use of warranty
doctrine, whereas the Restatement has radically broken with notions of
warranty.
Does it make any difference whether tort or warranty theory is used?
The two approaches do diverge in two respects: the requirement of
94. R ESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 402A, comment I at 354 (1965).
95. U.C.C. § 2-318. (This section has been made optional. See note 96 infra,)
In this respect section 43 of the UNIFOni REvSED SALES Aar (Proposed Final Draft
No. 1, 1944) and the 1949 version of section 2-318 were even bolder: they protected remote
vendees. Furthermore, section 2-718 provided for interpleader of the seller by his
buyer, who is in an intermediate position in the chain of distribution, and section 2-719
gave a "direct action against the seller or any person subject to interpleader." See gen.
eraly Weaver, Allocation of Risk in Products Liability Cases: The Need for a Revised
'Third-Party-Beneficiary Theory in UCC Warranty Actions, 52 VA. L. REv. 1028 (1966).
96. U.C.C. § 2-318, Comment 3. To meet increasing criticism, the Permanent Editorial
Board for the Uniform Commercial Code in its Report No. 3 (1967) has made sec-
tion 2-318 an optional alternative (Alternative A) giving two other alternatives. Sec-
tion 2-318, the Report says, is not "a section requiring uniformity throughout the United
States" (Report at x) and it adds: "There appears to be no national consensus as to
the scope of warranty protection which is proper, but the promulgation of alternatives
may prevent further proliferation of separate variations in state after state." Id. at 14.
Alternative B returns to the 1950 version of the Code and provides as follows: "A seller's
warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural person who may reasonably
be expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is injured in person
by breach of the warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the operation of this
section." Id. at 13. Alternative C is even more daring. It is "drawn to reflect the trend
of more recent decisions as indicated by Restatement of Torts 2d Section 402A extending
the rule beyond personal injuries." Id. at 14. It reads as follows: "A seller's warranty
whether express or implied extends to any person who may reasonably be expected to
use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is injured by breach of the warranty.
A seller may not exclude or limit the operation of this section with respect to Injury
to the person of an individual to whom the warranty extends." Id. at 13.
Two examples of state rejection of the original statement of section 2-318 may be given.
Virginia in 1962 substituted for section 2-318 an anti-privity statute, which, without
eliminating the notice and disclaimer provision, goes beyond section 2-318 and accords
warranty protection to an injured person, although he "did not purchase the goods from
the defendant, if the plaintiff was a person whom the manufacturer or seller might
reasonably have expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods . . ." VA. COne
ANN. § 8-654.3 (Supp. 1964), discussed in Emroch, Statutory Elimination of Privily Require.
ments in Product Liability Cases, 48 VA. L. REv. 982 (1962), and Speidel, supra note 78.
California, by contrast, has adopted the tort approach to products liability by eliminating
section 2-318 altogether since it represents "a step backwards" when compared with the
case law imposing strict liability in tort without contract or negligence. Report of
California State Bar Committee on Commercial Code, 37 CALiF. S.B.J. 143 (1962).
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notice and the availability of disclaimers. 7 The Restatement dispenses
with the notice requirement altogether s while the Code requires noti-
fication of a defect or injury within a reasonable time.°0 But on close
scrutiny, they are not too far apart. And where they cannot be recon-
ciled, the Code, it is submitted, is more satisfactory.
The Code, probably inspired by progressive case law,010 differentiates
between a merchant buyer and a retail (lay) consumer. For the former,
the time allowed for notification "after the defect was or should have
been discovered" is to be determined by commercial standards. For
the latter, reasonableness is to be "judged by different standards"; the
time for notification is subject to extension, because "the rule of requir-
ing notification is designed to detect commercial bad faith, not to
deprive a good faith consumer of its remedy."1 01 Even against his
immediate seller, a lay consumer will, it seems, not necessarily be
deprived of his remedy if he notified only after injury rather than after
acceptance. 02 The group of third party beneficiaries singled out for
protection by section 2-319 is treated with the same, if not greater,
consideration. Although required to give notice of injury, they have
complied with their good faith duty by notifying "once they have be-
come aware of their legal consideration."'103 Injured consumers are not
likely to consider notifying manufacturers until they have had legal
advice. 0
4
The Restatement goes too far; it dispenses with a notice requirement
altogether and permits recovery until the statute of limitations has
barred the claim. Certainly, the immediate buyer and the persons pro-
97. Since the injured person will have at his disposal the implied warranty of mer-
chantability (U.C.C. § 2-314), he will not have to worry about the requizement of reli-
ance upon the representation, skill or judgment of the seller which qualifies liability
for the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. U.C.C. § 2-315. Nor does
he have to worry about privity in cases where he relies on an express warranty. See
U.C.C. § 2-313, Comment 2. There is a further discrepancy worth mentioning: protec-
tion of a buyer against physical injury under the U.C.C. presupposes that the injury
proximately resulted from the breach of warranty. § 2-715(2)(b). A buyer then who uses
goods without discovery of a defect is not entitled to consequential damages if a rea-
sonable inspection would have disclosed the defect. U.C.C. § 2-715, Comment 5. Under
the Restatement rule the buyer is not precluded even if guilty of contributory negligence
so long as he not voluntarily assumed the risk, i.e., actually discovered the defect and
aware of the danger unreasonably proceeded to use the good. REsrATE ,T (SEcoND) or
TORTS § 402A, comment n (1965); see Speidel, supra note 78, at 831-34.
98. RmESTATEmNT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 402A comment m (1965).
99. U.C.C. § 2-607(3).
100. For a collection of the case law, see Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel, supra
note 11, at 1130-31.
101. U.C.C. § 2-607, Comment 4.
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tected by section 2-318 do not deserve such protection. And the manu-
facturer is vitally interested in being notified of a defect so he can
correct the manufacturing process or recall similarly defective goods.
105
The Restatement in the name of public policy has also done away
with disclaimers.
The consumer's cause of action does not depend upon the validity
of his contract with the person from whom he acquires the product,
and is not affected by any disclaimer or other agreement, whether
it be between the seller and his immediate buyer, or attached to
and accompanying the product into the consumer's hand.10
The Uniform Commercial Code, by contrast, has attempted to strike
a balance between freedom of contract and social control, so as to
leave room for legitimate bargaining about the allocation of risks due to
product defects. The guidelines set up, however, are unduly complicated
and vague. They distinguish between exclusion and modification of
warranties on the one hand, and modification or limitation of remedies
for their breach on the other. 07 By setting up different rules for the
two types of disclaimer, the Code gives the impression that its drafts-
men could not make up their minds on policy. Section 2-316 of the
Uniform Commercial Code shows a clear tendency in favor of freedom
to disclaim. Implied warranties may be excluded altogether. But there
is also an attempt to police disclaimers by requiring that they be couched
in language giving the buyer fair warning of the risks he assumes.108
Consumer protection is further strengthened by the provision that an
unconscionable limitation or modification of consequential damages
is not enforceable and that limitation "of consequential damages for
105. Franklin, supra note 11, at 1000.
106. 2 RESTATE.ENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment m at 355 (1965); accord,
Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964);
see Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960) (uniform war-
ranty proposed by Automobile Manufacturers Association). Contra, Williams v. Chrysler
Corp., 137 S.E.2d 225 (A. Va. 1964).
107. U.C.C. §§ 2-316, 2-719.
108. U.C.C. § 2-316(2) to -(3).
Were the validity of the warranty disclaimer involved in Henningsen to be evaluated
under the U.C.C., then section 2-719 would be controlling. The exclusion of a personal
injury claim would be prima fade unconscionable, and, the car not being an experi-
mental racing car, dearly understood to be driven at the owner's risk, prima fade
unconscionability would not be subject to rebuttal. Damage to the car would be gov-
erned by U.C.C. sections 2-719(1), -(2): since the car was totally destroyed, the linlted
remedy would fail of its essential purpose; the contractual modification of remedy would
be unavailable. See Rose v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 212 Cal. App. 2d 755, 28 Cal. Rptr.
185 (1963). There would be no need, therefore, to invoke the general unconscionability
provisions of section 2-302. The availability and general use of collision insurance
should not affect the validity of the disclaimer. The insurance company should be sub-
rogated to the claims of the policyholder.
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injury to the person in the case of consumer goods is prima facie un-
conscionable, but limitation of damages where the loss is commercial is
not."-0 9 This explicit control of unconscionable bargains is not re-
peated expressis verbis in the Code section permitting the exclusion or
modification of (implied) warranties. The omission may lead a reader
to assume that a warranty disclaimer which follows the statutory lan-
guage prescribed is above reproach and cannot be attacked under the
general provisions of the Code proscribing unconscionable clauses
(section 2-302) or imposing an obligation of good faith performance
(section 1-203).11 ° Such interpretation would be most unfortunate,
particularly since the Code's specification of the language of disclaimers
is inadequate. A seller, for instance, is permitted to exclude the all-
important warranty of merchantability by using in his disclaimer the
word "merchantability," provided, in the case of a writing, that he does
so in a conspicuous fashion.' This may trap an ordinary consumer. It
may be too much to hope that sellers will not make the most of the
opportunity.1" 2 Courts should, therefore, in an appropriate case be
allowed to read the general unconscionability and good faith provisions
into section 2-316 and to resort to section 2-316(1) which protects the
buyer from "unexpected and unbargained language of disclaimer by
denying effect to such language when inconsistent with language of
express warranty."" 3 The arsenal of weapons thus available will bring
the law of the Code and the Restatement closer together. This is all the
more important in view of the (widespread?) practice of enlarging the
109. U.C.C. § 2-719(3).
110. Hawkland, Limitation of Warranty Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 11
How. L.J. 28 (1965).
111. U.C.C. § 2-316(2) to -(3).
112. Complete disclaimer clauses seem, however, to be rare. Note, Unconscionable
Contracts Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 401. 408 (1961);
Franklin, supra note 11, at 1012.
Automobile manufacturers have, however, attempted to keep complete control over
their repair and replacement duties, which purport to be the buyers' sole remedy, by
making these duties conditional on the manufacturer being satisfied that a defect exists.
For the protection of the buyer against an "uncontrolled" decision on the manufac-
turer's part, see Cannon v. Pulliam Motor Co., 230 S.C. 131, 94 S.E.2d 397 (196).
113. U.C.C. §§ 1-203, 2-302, 2-313, 2-316, Comment 1. Unfortunately, Comment 1 to
section 2-302 declares that the "principle [laid down in the section] is one of prevention
of suppression and unfair surprise, and not of disturbance of allocation of risks becaue
of superior bargaining power." Under this interpretation a uniform but conspicuous
standard disclaimer clause would be valid. It seems preferable "to read U.C.C. section 2-
719 into the general unconscionability section." Franklin, supra note 11, at 1017. Ac-
cording to U.C.C. sections 2-313(l)(b), any description of the goods, which is made part
of the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the descrip-
tion. See also Peters, Remedies for Breach of Contracts Relating to the Sale of Goods
Under the Uniform Commercial Code: A Roadmap for Article Two, 73 YALE I.j. 199,
219, 282-83 (1963).
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group affected by disclaimers, by printing them in retail sales agree-
ments or on labels. 114
It would be unfair to criticize the draftsmen of the Code and the
Restatement for not having joined forces to work out a single theory
of products liability. The Restatement reflects the dramatic changes in
case law which took place after the rules of the Uniform Commercial
Code had become frozen.115 It is to the credit of the draftsmen of the
Code that they had the vision to foresee this possibility and to keep the
system of warranty law open. The accomplishments of much recent
case law, as crystalized in the Restatement, can be read into the Uniform
Commercial Code; the tension between Code and Restatement in
physical injury situations can therefore be narrowed if not overcome.
Still, it is desirable to clarify the relationship between Code and
Restatement. In this connection, attention should be paid to the most
recent cases concerned with the outer limits of the tort approach to
products liability. In dealing with this problem, a differentiation be-
tween physical injury and commercial losses, between consumer and
mercantile sales has, on occasion, been advanced. Since this paper
deals with the physical injury aspect of products liability, no attempt
will be made to discuss these questions in detail. Only briefly will they
be referred to so as to round out the picture.1 '
Protection of economic interests is not as fully advanced in our law
as is the security of persons and of tangible property. The reluctance of
many courts to allow recovery for negligent causing of economic harm
may serve as illustration. 17 This does not mean, however, that economic
interests have remained unprotected, it only implies that negligence
law, as a rule, is unavailable as an avenue for recovery against a remote
party."8 The injured consumer still has at his disposal the avenues of
114. E.g., Taylor v. Jacobson, 336 Mass. 709, 715, 147 N.E.2d 770, 774 (1958); Keeton,
Assumption of Risk in Products Liability Cases, 22 LA. L. REV. 122, 138 (1961); Note,
Disclaimers of Warranty in Consumer Sales, 77 HAtv. L. REV. 318 (1963).
A disclaimer between manufacturer and middleman, however, is not binding on a
consumer, especially if the latter is unaware of it. Franklin, supra note 11, at 1015;
Keeton, supra, at 134. U.C.C. section 2-318 has taken a step in the right direction.
It provides that "a seller may not exclude or limit the operation of this section."
115. But see note 95 supra.
116. They are admirably discussed in Note, Economic Loss in Products Liability
Jurisprudence, 66 CoLUm. L. RrEv. 917 (1966).
117. TWA v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 1 Iisc. 2d 477, 148 N.Y.S.2d 284 (Sup. Ct. 1955),
aff'd mem., 2 App. Div. 2d 666, 153 N.Y.S.2d 546 (1956); Inglis v. American Motors Corp.,
3 Ohio St. 2d 132, 209 N.E.2d 583 (1965).
118. "[E]conomic interests are not entitled to protection against mere negligence,"
PROSSFR ON ToRts, supra note 6, at 663. This is also the position taken by German law.
See text at note 147 infra.
908
Vol. 76: 887, 1967
Products Liability
(implied) warranty, and misrepresentation (express warranty). 0 But
warranty liability for economic losses, it has frequently been assumed,
presupposes privity, and liability for misrepresentation, justifiable reli-
ance. -20
Understandably, the advent of strict tort liability has led to attempts
to close the gap by using the newly discovered category. Since strict
tort liability has caught the imagination of the courts, it proved as
difficult to control as the broom in the Sorcerer's Apprentice. But there
has also been considerable resistance to letting strict liability inundate
the whole field of products liability. Two recent cases are representa-
tive of the policy conflict. In Santor v. A & Af Karagheusian, Incorpo-
rated, the New Jersey Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision, held
the manufacturer of a defective carpet directly liable to the ultimate
purchaser for loss of his bargain.--" The court saw no reason why
products liability to remote purchasers should be limited to physical
injuries caused by defective goods' -"2 In the court's view, the manu-
facturer under modern marketing conditions is the "father of the trans-
action," the dealer from whom plaintiff bought a mere way-station m
To insist that the only addressee of plaintiff's recovery should be the
dealer who, in turn, could recover from the manufacturer, would be
unnecessarily wasteful and frustrating, all the more since the dealer had
gone out of business. 4 Rationalizing direct recovery in terms of im-
plied warranty, characterized as a hybrid of contract and tort law, the
court permitted plaintiff to recover the difference between the price
paid for the carpet marketed as grade #1 and its actual value at the
119. Note, Economic Loss in Products Liability Jurisprudence, 66 CoLusm. L. REV.,
917, 931-36 (1966).
120. Very few are the cases, indeed, which have extended the domain of implied
warranties beyond immediate parties. Continental Copper & Steel Indus., Inc. v. E.C.
'Red" Cornelius, Inc., 104 So. 2d 40 (Fla. App. 1958); see Spence v. Three Rivers Builders
& Masonry Supply, Inc., 353 Mich. 120, 90 NA..2d 873 (1958) (alternate holding). For
the misrepresentation rule, see 2 RESrATENMEr (SEcOND) or Toars § 402B (1965).
121. 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965). The trial court had permitted the plaintiff to
recover under a theory of implied warranty. The appellate division reversed, holding
that absent physical injury, privity of contract is essential for recovery by a consumer
against the manufacturer. The Supreme Court relied on Randy Knitwear, Inc. . Ameri-
can Cyanamid Co., 11 N.Y2d 5, 181 N.E.2d 399, 226 N.YS.2d 363 (1962), without mention-
ing that in that case recovery was based on an express warranty. 44 N.J. at 60, 207 A.2d
at 309.
For an admirable discussion of the case, particularly the measure of damages, see
79 HAv. L REv. 1315 (1966). See also Note, Privily Eliminated as a Requirement in
Loss-of-Bargain Products Liability Cases, 19 Rtrrcrns L. REv. 715 (1965). For the German
counterpart of the discussion, see LATit, supra note 1, at 146-47. But see Price v. Gatlin,
241 Ore. 315, 405 P.2d 502 (1965).
122. 44 N.J. at 60, 207 A.2d at S09.
123. Id. at 59, 207 A.2d at 309.
124. Id. at 62, 207 A.2d at 310.
125. Id. at 64, 207 A.2d at 311.
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time when plaintiff knew or should reasonably have known that it was
defective.
126
In Seely v. White Motor Company, a majority of the California
Supreme Court in a strong dictum took issue with this position. 127 In
the absence of an express warranty the manufacturer will not be held
strictly accountable for mere economic losses. Otherwise, the court felt,
the manufacturer would be responsible for damages of "unknown and
unlimited scope."'128 Tort liability, according to the court, was not
designed to undermine the warranty provisions of the Sales Act or of
the Uniform Commercial Code, but rather to govern the distinct
problem of physical injuries.129 Although the rules of warranty frus-
trate rational compensation for physical injury, they function well in a
commercial setting. 30 Replying to the opinion in the Santor case the
court had this to say:' 31
The distinction that the law has drawn between tort recovery for
physical injuries and warranty recovery for economic loss is not
arbitrary and does not rest on the "luck" of one plaintiff in having
an accident causing physical injury. The distinction rests, rather,
on an understanding of the nature of the responsibility a manu-
126. Id. at 68-69, 207 A.2d at 314.
127. 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965). Plaintiff had bought from a
dealer on the installment plan a truck manufactured by defendant, signing a purchase
order in which the manufacturer had "warranted each new motor vehicle to be free
of defects," but had limited its obligation by the typical repair and replacement clause.
When it was discovered that the truck was subject to severe vibrations making driving
difficult, the dealer with the manufacturer's guidance made many unsuccessful attempts
to eliminate "galloping." Plaintiff refused to make further payments and when the
dealer repossessed, brought suit in express warranty against dealer and manufacturer for
the portion of the purchase price paid and for loss of profits, since he was unable to use the
truck. In addition, he sought recovery (in tort) for damage to the truck suffered in an
accident allegedly caused by the defect. Recovery of the down payment and loss of
profits were allowed on the theory that this was a breach of an express warranty. But
recovery for damage to the truck was denied since the evidence failed to establish that
the accident was caused by the defect. The repair and replacement clause invoked by
defendant to defeat the claim for damages was disregarded in the light of repeated
failures to correct the defect as promised. Id. at 14, 403 P.2d at 148, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 20.
128. Id. at 17, 403 P.2d at 150-51, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 22-23.
129. Id. at 15, 403 P.2d at 149. 45 Cal. Reptr. at 21.
130. Id. at 16, 403 P.2d at 150, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 22.
131. Id. at 18, 403 P2.d at 151, 45 Cal. Rptr, at 23. A further comment on Santor
is also worth quoting. "The court [in Santor] held the manufacturer liable for the
difference between the price paid for the carpet and its actual market value on the
basis of strict liability in tort. We are of the opinion, however, that it was inapproprlate
to impose liability on that basis in the Santor case, for it would result in imposing
liability without regard to what representations of quality the manufacturer made. It
was only because the defendant in that case marketed the rug as Grade #1 that the
court was justified in holding that the rug was defective. Had the manufacturer not so
described the rug, but sold it 'as is,' or sold it disclaiming any guarantee of quality,
there would have been no basis for recovery in that case. Only if someone had been
injured because the rug was unsafe for use would there have been any basis for imposing
strict liability in tort." Id. at 17-18, 403 P.2d at 151, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 23.
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facturer must undertake in distributing his products. He can ap-
propriately be held liable for physical injuries caused by defects by
requiring his goods to match a standard of safety defined in terms
of conditions that create unreasonable risks of harm. He cannot be
held for the level of performance of his products in the consumer's
business unless he agrees that the product was designed to meet
the consumer's demands. A consumer should not be charged at the
will of the manufacturer with bearing the risk of physical injury
when he buys a product on the market. He can, however, be fairly
charged with the risk that the product will not match his economic
expectations unless the manufacturer agrees that it will. Even in
actions for negligence, a manufacturer's liability is limited to
damages for physical injuries and there is no recovery for economic
loss alone.
Justice Peters, in his dissenting and concurring opinion, was in
favor of drawing the line between tort and contract liability in terms
of consumer as contrasted with commercial sales, treating the litigation
in Seely as involving a consumer sale.132
The German Law
In reporting on the civil law, it seems best to start with the German
system. Despite valiant attempts by the courts to free the case law
from the fetters of the Civil Code [BGB], German law of products
liability still represents a phase in development which French and
American law have left behind.133 And proposed statutory changes
would pattern Dutch law after the progressive French system. 3 4
In Germany, consumers are faced with a fault principle to which
the BGB appears to be more firmly committed than the law of many
other legal systems. It dominates contract as well as tort law.235 In both
areas of civil liability the recovery of damages is predicated on a show-
ing of negligence, at least in principle. Respect for the dignity of the
individual and the need of society to encourage productive activities
militates, we are told, against the abolition of the fault rule.30 This
132. Id. at 28-29, 403 P.2d at 158, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 30.
133. See authorities cited note 161 infra.
134. See the report of the Dutch Attorney General, Dr. G.E. Langenneijer in [1963]
KAIssRumm Fotvum 29. For the Scandinavian Law, see Kruse, Producers' Liability in
Scandinavian Law, in DrE HAFrUNG DES WAR.HEmRsTELERs 55 (Arbeitea zur Rechts-
vergleichung Nr. 28, E. von Caemmerer ed. 1966).
135. BGB §§ 275, 276, 278, 823, 831; AV. Firasctma, DAs ScniiuLRcrr § 53 (1965);
see 3 F. ScHLEGELBERGER-W. HEFFERMEHL, Komm NTAR zu.nh HANDEI.s.ESErUzC 2033-36
(4th ed. 1965); MAller, Zur Haftung des Warenherstellers gegenilber dem Enderbraucer,
165 AcP 285,289 (1965).
136. 1 LARENz, supra note 3. § 19; Wahl, Das Verschuldensprinzip, supra note 9,
at 17-35. But see, e.g., Gernhuber, Haltung des Warenhcrstellers, supra note 20; Lorenz,
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attitude has serious repercussions for products liability. The aedilitian
remedies (rescission and price reduction), it will be remembered, are
open to the buyer of defective goods even against an innocent seller.
To this extent German law is willing to invoke strict liability in order
to restore the disturbed equivalence between the price paid and the
quality of the commodity.137 But, unless the seller has given an ex-
press warranty or has been guilty of fraudulent concealment,138 the
buyer's damage remedy is predicated on negligent performance.130
Tort liability, because of the negligence requirement, is also an in-
adequate corrective. Consumer protection, consequently, falls short of
the solicitude shown in other legal systems. This is all the more re-
markable since Germany like other countries has found it necessary or
expedient to mitigate the fault principle by exceptions and counterrules.
German law, for instance, imposes strict liability for extra-hazardous
activities; it provides for vicarious liability, and it has rules changing
the burden of proof concerning negligence and a doctrine akin to res
ipsa loquitur (Beweis des ersten Anscheins). But these exceptions have
been narrowly confined, and the potentialities inherent in the counter-
rules have never been fully exploited.
Before going into the technical details of German law a few general
remarks about these tendencies to pull away from negligence may
provide perspective.
German law recognizes strict liability for harm resulting from ab-
normally dangerous conditions and activities. 40 Gefiihrdungshaftung
covers activities such as blasting and even the operation of a railroad
or motor vehicle. But these and other exceptions to the fault rule have
remained isolated instances and have not been generalized into a
broader theory of liability for dangerous products.' 41 Case law, it is
Rechtsvergleichendes zur Haftung des Warenherstellers und Liejeranten gegenilber
Dritten, in FESTSCIFT F R NoTTARP 59 (1962); Lorenz, Warenabsatz, supra note 20, at 14,
137. BGB §§ 459, 462; W. FLUME, EIGENSCHAFrsIRRTUM UND KAuF 47 (1948); Kessler,
The Protection of the Consumer, supra note 13, at 274; MOller, supra note 135, at 312.
138. BGB § 463. The policy reasons against imposing strict liability across the board
are discussed in 2 E. RABEL, DAs RaCIT DES WARENKA FS 267-70 (1965).
139. J. EssER, ScnurLDaRcr §§ 106, 107 (2d ed. 1960).
140. See generally F. BIENENFELD, DME -AFrUNGEN OrNE VERSC IULDEN (1933); J. EssMt,
GRUNDLAGEN UND ENTWICKLUNG DER GEFXHRDUNGSHAFrUNG (1941).
For a detailed discussion of the range of statutory regulations introducing Gefilhr-
dungshaftung, see J. EssER, SCHULDREGHrT §§ 212-16 (2d ed. 1960). All statutes imposing
Gefiihrdungshaftung have set upper limits to recovery to provide insurance companies
with an actuarial basis for their premium calculations. Id. § 220(3)(e).
141. 2 L. ENNECCERUS-H. LEHMANN, RECHT DER SCHULDVERHALTNISSE § 230 II (15th ed.
1958); SOERGEL-SIEBERT, supra note 44, Vorbem. 17 vor § 823; Esser, Die Zweispurigheit
unseres Haftpflichtrechts, 8 JURIMsN-ZTUNG 129 (1953); Miller, supra note 135, at 285,
289. But see W. ERMANN, Handkommentar zum Biirgerlicher Gesetzbuch § 831, Bem. 7(1).
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true, has often announced in sweeping language, a duty not to let
goods dangerous to health enter commerce.1' But, as we shall see, this
duty has never been pushed to its full implications: strict liability.1 3
The treatment of vicarious liability furnishes another striking illus-
tration of the sway of the fault rule.' 4" German law makes provision
for the risks inherent in the division of labor, but only half-heartedly.
Different principles are applied in contract and tort situations. Accord-
ing to the law of contracts a debtor cannot delegate his contractual
dudes to another without being responsible for the latter's fault in
performance. 45 Proper care in selection and supervision is no excuse.
Thus, though the fault principle is abolished with regard to the master,
it reappears as far as the servant's performance is concerned. In tort
law, the situation is reversed. Liability of an employer for harmful
conduct of an employee is predicated on fault of the employer, either
in the form of negligent supervision or negligent selection.' As far as
an employee is concerned he need not be at fault. It is enough that he
commits a wrongful act, that is, that his activities have caused injury
to person or property; a mere pecuniary loss is insufficient. 47 The
burden of exculpation is placed on the employer, 48 who must show
proper care in supervision and selection, just as the seller in a damage
suit for injuries caused by a defective product must establish that his
servant was not negligent in performance. 40
So much by way of introduction. It is time now to turn from the
outline of general principles to concrete problems.
One of the most fascinating cases in the field is an old decision of the
Reichsgericht, the so-called Brunnensalz Fall (synthetic mineral salt
142. E.g., Judgment of Jan. 17, 1940, 163 RGZ 21, 25-26; accord, Judgment of June
23, 1952, [1952] VEmsR 857 (Bundesgerichtshof); for a collection of authorities, see AroLyr,
supra note 21, at 95 n.2; H. STOLL, DAs Lk4NDEN AUlS EIENE GEAR 337 (1961).
143. See text at note 162 infra.
144. For a comparative treatment, see generally, Neuner, Respondeat Superior in the
Light of Comparative Law, 4 LA. L. RFv. 1 (1941) (advancing the thesis that, on coer
analysis, the cleavage between the German and other legal systems is not as sharp as
is often assumed).
145. BGB § 278; Miller, supra note 135, at 290.
146. BGB § 831.
147. See Judgment of March 20, 1919, 95 RGZ 173.
148. 2 SOORGEL-SIBERT, supra note 44, § 831, Bem. 78.
149. Judgment of Oct. 23, 1958, 28 BGHZ 252; Judgment of Feb. 11, 1957, 23 BGHZ
288; Judgment of Dec. 18, 1952, 8 BGHZ 239; Judgment of June 15, 1935, 148 RGZ 148. This
is in keeping with what appears to be now the prevailing view: a debtor, when sued for
breach of contract, has the burden of exculpation. BGB § 282; see A. tom.mrn, ScnULD.
Rncn-r § 30 I (3rd ed. 1964); 1 LARENz, supra note 3, § 23 I b; Raape, Die Bcweislast bei
positiver Vertragsverletzung, 147 AcP 217 (1941). This rule appears also to be applicable to
the sale of defective merchandise. Judgment of Feb. 18, 1908,63 ScuffArch 357 (Reichsgericht)
(bottle of mineral water sold by purveyor of food and drink contained acid); Gernhuber,
Haftung des Warenherstellers, supra note 20.
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case).', It is all the more remarkable since it contains the germs for an
imaginative reformation of traditional doctrine. Plaintiff, who had been
prescribed the medicine by her physician, bought it in a pharmacy in
the original package. When she took it, she suffered internal injuries
caused by finely ground splinters of glass contained in the salt. Suit
was brought against the manufacturer on two counts: in addition to a
tort count asserting liability of the defendant for negligence in the
manufacturing process, plaintiff based her damage claim on a contract
of guarantee running directly from the manufacturer to her, and, in
the alternative, on an implied assignment by the pharmacist of his
warranty claim against the manufacturer. The Reichsgericht, in dealing
with the contract count, did not find the privity obstacle insurmount-
able. But, as the court held, the factual basis for finding the required
intention to warrant the purity of the product was lacking. The fact that
it was distributed in the original package was insufficient to allow such
an inference. To imply an intention to assign the warranty claim would
be even more unnatural and far-fetched. The court added, however,
that in an appropriate case an express warranty might be found in the
wording of a label or otherwise.151 With regard to the tort count,
plaintiff was more successful. The Reichsgericht reversed and remanded,
emphasizing that since the plaintiff had established that the cause of
the injury occurred in the defendant's plant, he did not have to prove
how the glass splinters came to be in the bottle. The defendant had
the full burden of establishing his lack of negligence. To do that, he
had either to identify the employee responsible for the defective prod-
uct and establish proper care in his selection and supervision, or, if he
could not identify the employee, to establish that he had discharged his
duties with regard to every worker who might be responsible for the
defective product. In the language of the opinion, only a well-super-
vised personnel is well-selected.
152
In evaluating the decision, it must be projected against its back-
ground: German sales, contract and tort law. The injured plaintiff
could not have obtained compensation for her injury from her im-
mediate seller, the pharmacist. The latter was only under duty to re-
fund the purchase price. 53 As selling the medicine in the original
package was not blameworthy, no claim for damages was available against
150. Judgment of Feb. 25, 1915, 87 RGZ 1.
151. Id. at 2.
152. Id. at 5-4.
153. BGB §§ 459, 462.
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him. Also, plaintiff could not contend that the pharmacist was vicar-
iously liable for the negligent act of his supplier. Of course, the manu-
facturer had broken his sales contract with the pharmacist, but since
the manufacturer was not performing the pharmacist's contract with
plaintiff, the rules imposing strict liability on a debtor for faulty dele-
gated performance did not apply.'0 4 (Even had the pharmacist ordered
the medicine from the manufacturer on plaintiff's request, the result
would have been the same under German law, unless the medicine was
directly delivered by the manufacturer to the plaintiff.)'5 Nor could
the injured plaintiff sue the manufacturer on the basis of a sales con-
tract; none existed. Finally, a Reichsgericht obsessed with the sub-
jective theory of contracts was even unwilling to find a direct contract
warranting the purity of the product retailed in the orginal package.
Its attitude was more daring with regard to the availability of tort law.
The privity doctrine has remained strong enough since the mineral
salt case to put serious roadblocks in the path of contractual recovery
by a consumer or user against a remote manufacturer. A timid handling
of vicarious liability, a conservative approach to the measure of dam-
ages, a reluctance to find the necessary intention for a direct contract
of guarantee, all combined to impede, if not prevent, the expansion of
contractual liability.
Tort law. Subsequent case law has elaborated the tort themes which
appear in the synthetic mineral salt case.00 The courts have felt that
traditional interpretations of the BGB gave an undue advantage to big
and even medium sized industry over small enterprises. The former
all too often escape liability for their defective products because they
are able to point to the elaborate organization, care in selection of
management and supervisory personnel, elaborate employee training
programs and the practice of having new products tested by independent
institutes and laboratories. 1 7 To remedy this situation, the courts
seized upon a provision which makes a corporation unconditionally
liable for the tort "of its constitutionally appointed representatives."' '
Of equal or greater importance was the imposition of a general duty
154. E.g., Judgment of Jan. 4, 1921, 101 RGZ 157, 158; ADOLrF, supra note 12, at 42-46.
155. Judgment of Sept. 21, 1923, 108 RGZ 221, 223.
156. Judgment of Feb. 25, 1915, 87 RGZ 1, discussed in text at note 150 supra.
157. H. WEIGERT, DIE AussERvERTRALicHE HAfrruNo VON GROSSBETRDEx FOR ANGE-
SlTI.LTE 5-6 (1925); mfiller, supra note 135, at 288-92. The concept of employee (Verricht.
ungsgehilfe) is rather narrow. It does not cover an independent contractor. A Seller who
is unable to control and supervise the production of a supplier or the testing of a new
drug or cosmetic by a scientific institute is not vicariously liable for the latters mistake.
unless he was careless in his selection. Mfiller, supra note 135, at 289-90.
158. BGB § 81.
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to develop an organization with standards of supervision and control
capable of preventing potentially dangerous situations.10
Still, the courts have not abolished altogether the statutory require-
ment of negligence. Case law still distinguishes between defects re-
sulting from faulty construction and design and those resulting from a
miscarriage of the manufacturing process affecting only an individual
item. The former are treated, so to speak, as representing negligence
per se;'160 they reflect a faulty organization. The latter are still subject
to exculpation. 6"
A fairly recent decision of the Bundesgerichtshof dramatically illus-
trates the predicament of the consumer. 0 2 The buyer of a bicycle carry-
ing the brand name of the defendant manufacturer had suffered injury
because of the collapse of the handle bar. His tort suit was unsuccessful.
The trial court had found that the defect was not due to faulty con-
struction affecting the entire series of bicycles. The defect was due
rather to the fault of an otherwise competent worker. In denying re-
covery the court emphasized that modem mass production makes the
defectiveness of individual products unavoidable. These defects, said
the court, can neither be fully eliminated, nor discovered by inspection,
however careful the system of production or checking.
Contract law. Time and again efforts have been made to better the lot
of the consumer by adapting contract law to the intricacies of the
modem distribution process. The failure of attempts to invoke
vicarious liability 63 is dramatically illustrated by a decision of the
Bundesgerichtshof of 1956.164 The buyer of a motorcycle with a de-
fective steering mechanism sought recovery for his injuries from the
dealer, who had bought the vehicle ready for use from a widely-known
159. Judgment of April 3, 1940, 10 DR 1293 (1940); Soas, supra note 7, at 25;
2 SoEacEL-Smnarar, supra note 141, § 831, Bern. 1, 62.
This duty has been supplemented by an elaborate network of duties to give directions
and warning against unsafe use. Lorenz, Lllnderbericht und Rechtsvergleichende Bclrach.
tung zur Haftung des Warenherstellers, in Di. -AFrrNG DEs WARENHERSTELLR S 5, 16
(Arbeiten zur Rechtsvergleichung, Nr. 28, E. von Caemmerer ed. 1966).
160. See Judgment of Jan. 17, 1940, 163 RGZ 21, 26.
161. See Sirms, sup-a note 7, at 25-26, 73; Lorenz, Ldnderbericht, supra note 159,
at 13-18.
162. Judgment of April 21, 1956, [1956] VEasR 410, 411 (Bundesgerichtsho). But see
Judgment of Feb. 28, 1955, [1956] VansR 785 (Landgericht Hanau).
163. See generally ADoL'rF, supra note 21, at 48; Srrmars, supra note 7, at 6-.37; Lorenz,
Rechtsvergleichendes zur Haftung des Warenherstellers, supra note 136, at 59, 75-76;
Markert, Die Schadenshaftung des Warenherstellers gegenilber dem Verbraucher, 19 Da
BriEns-Ba.JRATE 231, 234 (1964). But see J. EssER, 8CHULDiC}IIr §§ 58(2)(c) (2d ed. 1960).
164. Judgment of March 15, 1956, [1956] VEasR 259; discussed in Lorenz, Landcr
bericht, supra note 159, at 41. It is interesting that the Reichsgericht imposed strict
duties of care on a grocer selling canned meat. It rejected his argument that he was under
no duty to sample since his supplier had assured him of the wholesomeness of the cans,
Judgment of April 19, 1918, 22 REcr Nr. 1363 (1918) (Relchsgericht).
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manufacturer. The seller's breach of contract, as plaintiff claimed,
consisted in his failure carefully to inspect the vehicle before sale. The
court refused to honor this argument. It held that the dealer had a
"duty" only to make an external inspection and to take a ride. (Since
the defect was latent, these measures did not reveal it). The court con-
sidered it too burdensome to require the dealer to take the vehicle
apart. And it refused to impose vicarious liability on the dealer for
the negligent acts of the manufacturer. The court may have been
guided by principles of limiting liability, but it gave no policy reason
in its opinion for not imposing vicarious liability; rather, it spoke only
in the conclusory terms of "no duty." The holding in this case is of
particular importance, since under the prevailing view it makes no
difference whether the defective product was acquired before or after
sale to the consumer.165 Since the manufacturer himself may not be
liable in tort,166 the buyer may well be without remedy unless contract
law provides other ways of reaching the manufacturer directly or in-
directly.
Direct Warranty. In the synthetic mineral salt case,107 it will be
remembered, the Reichsgericht did not regard a direct contract of
guarantee running from the manufacturer to the consumer a logical
impossibility. Subsequent case law has used this device of reaching the
manufacturer most sparingly. It appears to have been invoked only once
against the manufacturer of a defective truck and, in that case, was
applied only because an express warranty was given. 08 It would have
been quite natural to imply a direct warranty of quality whenever
products were sold under a trademark or a brand name. But, despite
urging in the academic literature, this has not yet happened.lca The
165. Judgment of Dec. 21, 1920, 101 RGZ 152, 154, unless the supplier dealt directly
'with the buyer, Judgment of Sept. 21, 1923, 108 RGZ 221. Occasionally case law has
corrected this result by finding that a seller warranted the supplier's performance. Eg.,
Judgment of Jan. 4, 1921, 101 RGZ 157 (risk of delay in performance by the supplier
assumed by the seller). See also Judgment of Oct. 25, 1921, 103 RGZ 77 (sale of summer
wheat seed; the seller delivered winter wheat seed which was labeled summer wheat seed).
166. See BGB § 831 and cases cited note 162 supra.
167. Judgment of Feb. 25, 1915, 87 RGZ 1, discussed in text at note 150 supra.
168. 163 RGZ 21, 31 (liability of the manufacturer of a motor vehicle on the basis
of a factory warranty (Fabrikgarantie)). Since limitation clauses in modem factory war-
ranties have been honored by the courts, consumer protection typically does not extend to
physical injuries suffered. Lindau, [1955] VERsR 428, on the duty to repair. Henningsen v.
Bloomfield Motors forms an interesting contrast. A dictum in a recent unreported decision
of the Bundesgerichtshof may, however, indicate a new trend: the court points out
that the clauses may be against public policy. Lorenz, Rechtsvergleichendes zur Haltung
des Warenherstellers, supra note 136, at 81.
169. The decision in the bicycle case, Judgment of April 21, 1956, [1956] VlrsR 410,
411 (Bundesgerichtshof), discussed in text at note 162 supra, furnishes an illustration.
See generally GRAU, ZUWAIMENHXNGENDE R.carsMwERHXLTNIsSE, GE-ACSCrmIurr FIn
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decision of the Bundesgerichtshof in the bicycle case amply proves this
point.
To overcome the shortcomings of tort law the domain of third party
beneficiary contracts has steadily been increased, even where the in-
jured party was clearly not entitled to demand performance of the
primary duty assumed by the promisor 70 Differentiating between the
primary duty to perform and the collateral duty to act carefully,17' the
courts have expanded the latter duty to protect persons whose injury by
defective performance was foreseeable to the promisor.'7 2 But strangely
enough, third party beneficiary notions have never been applied by
courts of last resort in favor of a remote vendee who suffered personal
injuries. Application of the doctrine has been limited to protect mem-
bers of the household and employees of the original buyer or tenants for
whose support buyer or tenant were legally or morally responsible.13
Loading the Measure of Damages. Until recently, modem case law
was quite promising on this score.'7" It permitted, for instance, a
promisee who had contracted for the undisclosed principal to collect
for the latter's loss, a bailee to collect for the loss of the bailor. Further-
more, a seller, who having shipped the goods was no longer responsible
for the loss or damage to the goods, could bring an action against the
carrier for the buyer's damages.175 A fairly recent, not officially re-
ported, decision of the Bundesgerichtshof may even have gone a step
further in protecting the interest of remote parties.176 Plaintiff, a manu-
facturer of yam, who had bought lubricating oil for the machinery that
was warranted "to wash out," was permitted to claim the damages
suffered by a buyer of his yarns because oil had permanently stained
the buyer's fabric. Relying on the presumed intention of the parties,
the court permitted recovery. The opinion is quite explicit in stating
that plaintiff's recovery is not predicated on his liability to his customer.
SECKEL 359 (1927); KESSF.ER, DIE FAmULssIOKEIT, supra note 2, at 112; LAr, supra
note 1, at 77; SiMms, supra note 7, at 37-48; 2 STAUDINGER, supra note 4, § 433, Bern. 97a.
170. 2 AV. FLUME, ALLGzEENER TEIL DES BOGERLICHEN REcHTs: DAS REcIITrsc.,IIXsr,
§ 16(4)(f) (1965); G. WESENBERG, VERTRAOE ZUGUNSTEN DRiER 137-43 (1949); cf. Gernhuber,
Drittwirkungen ir Schuldverhdltnis kraft Leistungsndihe, in FESTSC IRI rihO ARTiiuR
NIKsaC- 249 (1958). See the penetrating remarks of Wieacker, Das Bfirgerliche Recht,
supra note 1, at 16.
171. 1 LARENz, supra note 3, § 11 II.
172. Judgment of May 15, 1959, in 12 NEur JumsTsCHE NVOCHENSCURIrT 1676 (Bundes-
gerichtshof).
173. 1 LARENZ, supra note3, § 11 III.
174. I have borrowed an expression coined by Stoljar, supra note 7, at 309.
175. 1 LARENZ, supra note 3, § 14 IV; accord, Judgment of July 10, 1963, 40 BGHZ
91, 99-101; Judgment of May 16, 1917, 90 RGZ 240.
176. Judgment of Aug. 7, 1959 (Bundesgerichtshof), referred to in 40 BGHZ 91, 105;
see 2 ERmAN, supra note 141, § 249, Bern. Ile.
918
Vol. 76: 887, 1967
Products Liability
Since the claim of the plaintiff was assignable, the injured purchaser of
the yarn could have acquired by assignment a cause of action against the
seller of the oil, although the latter's warranty did not run to him.
Under this approach the buyer of the unwholesome medicine and the
buyer of the bicycle,177 would acquire a contractual claim against the
manufacturer and would no longer be without remedy. This result
would not be too harsh on the manufacturer because it would not in-
crease unreasonably the measure of his liability. He should not be able
to take advantage of the facts that his immediate buyer did not suffer
any damages and that the person to whom he owes his primary obliga-
tion to deliver and the person who suffers damages are not identical.""8
Unfortunately, this development was brought to an abrupt halt in a
most recent decision of the Bundesgerichtshof, again involving a com-
mercial loss by a third party.vo The plaintiff had used, in the manu-
facture of belts, poorly dyed suede leather bought from the defendant.
He had sold the belts to a dress manufacturer, who in turn sold his
dresses, with the belt, to a mail-order house. Since the dresses had
suffered stains where the fabric had come in contact with the belts, the
dress manufacturer took them back and refunded the purchase price.
But he did not press any claim against plaintiff.180 Nevertheless, the
trial and intermediate courts read into the sales contract an implied
term which gave plaintiff the privilege to sue for the damage suffered
by his customers. The Bundesgerichtshof reversed, holding that under
the facts of the case no basis existed for finding such an implied term.
The requisite intention on the defendant's part to be bound by such
an onerous undertaking was completely lacking.18'
Of late, the existing state of affairs has come under increasing attack.
The draftsmen of the Code, the critics have pointed out, although repre-
senting the spirit of an age different from our own,182 did not em-
brace the utopian delusion of being able to tie the hands of courts by
177. Cases cited notes 150, 162 supra.
178. For a discussion of the limits of recovery, see TAE xr, supra note 3, at 48. Loading
of the measure of damages (Liquidation des Drittinteresses) presupposes that the damage
can only occur in the person of the third party, but not of the promisee. Mflller, supra
note 135, at 294-99. According to the Reichsgericht, Liquidation des Drittinteresses is only
allowed if the quantum of recovery remains the same, irrespective of the peron of the
claimant. Judgment of Dec. 18, 1942, 170 RGZ 246.
179. Judgment of July 10, 1963, 40 BGHZ 91, 99.
180. Id. at 92.
181. Id. at 102-05. This decision then brings German law in line with our own cze law,
which permits a buyer who has resold defective goods to recover the damage he has paid
or is probably liable to pay to a subvendee. 3 Wuxuso., SALES § 615a (rev. ed. 1948).
182. Isele, Ein halbes Jahrhundert deutsches Biirgerlichies Gesetzbuch, 150 AcP 1-3
(1948); see F. WmAcEm, DAs SOZIMAIODELL DER KLASSicHEN PRv1Ar SGtErrsEic 1aFt
tND DIE ENTIVICKLUNG DER MODERNEN GESrs caArr (1953).
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a system of elaborate casuistic details. The German Civil Code is far
from being a closed system. It contains innumerable safety valves. A
daring court is, therefore, not prevented from experimenting and,
particularly, from abolishing the differentiation between faulty design
and miscarriage of the manufacturing process situations.183 It is too
early to forecast coming innovations in case law, but there are some
indications of a tendency to reform the system from within. The con-
cluding sentence of the opinion of the Bundesgerichtshof in the leather
belt case contains a remarkable observation in the form of a question.
It asks whether the ultimate consumer of a product which has reached
him through an anonymous chain of distributors should not be pro-
tected in his reliance on the quality of goods as advertised.18 4
All suggestions for the reform of German law have one feature in
common: to break with the subjectivist tradition still prevailing in the
law of torts and of contracts. Advocates of the tort approach to prod-
ucts liability have suggested either an extension of the principle of
Gefihrdungshaftung85 or a strengthening of the existing tendencies
toward an objective theory of negligence. They have denied that in
terms of negligence there is any difference between defects caused by
faulty design and miscarriage of the manufacturing process.18 0 Advocates
of a contract approach have pleaded for the recognition of a new
category of contract, the so-called faktisches Vertragsverhdltnis. Their
aim is to find an "implied-in-fact contract without mutual consent"
between producer and consumer to establish privity.18 7 Others, taking
account of the facts of modern merchandising have invoked the princi-
ple that legitimate expectations of the consumer with regard to quality
deserve recognition by a broad principle of liability based on reliance.188
Occasionally, the whole fault principle has been put in question, but
the advocates of increased liability are not prepared to suggest the
imposition of liability for harm which was unforeseeable on the basis
of existing scientific or technical knowledge at the time of marketing.18 0
183. Snarrs, supra note 7, at 72-73; Lorenz, iinderbericht, supra note 159, at 71.
184. Judgment of July 10, 1963, 40 BGHZ 91, 108.
185. Gernhuber, Haftung des Warenherstellers, supra note 20; see Sirris, supra note 7,
at 83.
186. Si mrs, supra note 7, at 72-73.
187. H. SUCH, WIRTSCHATSPLANUNG UND SACHnNGELHAFrUNG 113 (1949). Contra, Simrrs,
supra note 7, at 39-46.
This theory should not be unfamiliar to the American reader. See Costigan, Implied.in.
Fact Contracts and Mutual Assent, 33 HAav. L. REv. 376, 385 (1920).
188. Lorenz, Warenabsatz, supra note 20.
189. See id. at 10; Lorenz, LUnderbericht, supra note 159, at 17, 53. At the time of this
writing, criminal and civil proceedings have begun in Germany against certain executives
of the manufacturer of thalidomide (Contergan), apparently on the basis of negligence.
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The French Law
Under French law, the consumer is better taken care of than under
German law. Indeed his protection is similar to that provided by
American law. But the emphasis of French products liability law is on
contractual rather than tort remedies.
Contract Liability. The French Civil Code imposes liability for
defects which the seller either knew or should have known about
(vice cachd); it distinguishes between an "innocent" seller and one with
knowledge, le vendeur de bonne and le vendeur de mauvaise foi.
10
The "innocent" seller in addition to his aedilitian liability10' is only
obligated to compensate the buyer for the "frais occasionnds par la
vente," the expenses occasioned by the sale.Y1 2 But the seller with
knowledge of the defect is liable for "tours les dommages et intir~ts" in
addition to the purchase price.10 3 He must pay all losses incurred
(damnum emergens) and gains prevented (lucrum cessans),104 even if
not foreseeable (impr visible).1'0
But the distinction between sellers of good faith and those of bad
faith has suffered erosion. Case law has broadened the liability of in-
nocent sellers to cover reliance damages, including the damages the
buyer has to pay victims injured by the defective product.100 A bold
decision of the Cour de Cassation rendered in 1925 has reinforced this
A bill drafted by the Ministry of Justice provides for a change in BGB section 831. It
removes the employer's immunity from liability even if he was not at fault, but requires
fault on the part of the employee. SOERGEL-SEBERT, supra note 44, at § 831, Bem. 1.
190. C. Crv. arts. 1643, 1645, 1646. The buyer is also not protected if he should have
known of the defectiveness.
191. I.e., rescission or price diminution. The latter, though not mentioned in article
1645, is available according to the literature. 2 A. CoLv:-H. CAPrrrTA, Cours ELEtr rA=
DE DRorr crvIL. vANWs No. 929 (10th ed. L. Juliot de la Morandiere 1948); 3 H. MxiiA v,
LE.oNs DE DRorr cvWL No. 988 (1960).
192. C. Crv. art. 1646.
193. C. Cxv. art. 1645. French law in this respect follows civilian (Roman) tradition,
J. J6RS--%V. KUNKEL--L. WENGER, RoMItSCHE PuVAwmzcirr § 124 (3d ed. 1949). In contrast
to German law (BGB § 463) knowledge of the defect is sufficient; fraudulent concealment
is not required. If the seller was guilty of the latter, the buyer can have the contract
annulled by court action and can recover damages in tort. C. Crv. arts. 1109, 1117, 1382.
194. M. PLANioL, G. 1RiPERT & J. HAmEL, 10 TRArit PRATiQUE Er TLOR-TIQ E Dn Dnorr
cIVIL FRANgAis No. 134 (2d ed. 1956); 2 RAF.L, supra note 138, at 255-61; Mazeaud, La
Responsabilitd civiie du vendeur-fabricant, 53 Rxv. Tiat. D.C. 611,613 (1955).
195. FICKE, supra note 61, at 24; 3 H. & L. ZMAZEAUD & A. TuNc, T nrr Ttuoiuqur Er
PRATIQUE DE LA RIESPONSABIL CIVILE DALICFUEuL KL CON-R AcruELL. Nos. 2190, 2376, (5th
ed. 1960).
196. Ducoudr6 v. Sebert, [1848] D.P. I. 187, [1848] S. Jur. I. 705 (Cass. req.). Suit by a
buyer, a dealer in fertilizer, against his seller. The plaintiff because of the poor quality of
the product had been successfully sued by farmers, his sub-vendees, for crop losses. The
plaintiff demanded recovery of the amount of the judgments against him, the cost of
litigation, and resale and loss of profits. Despite the "innocence" of the defendant the
Cour de Cassation alirmed the judgment below in favor of plaintiff, except for the claim
for lost profits.
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trend. 97 According to the memorandum submitted to the court by its
rapporteur this liability is but a "logical extension" of the principle
that the buyer has to be put in the position he would have been in had
there been no contract. Conceding that the legislator did not have this
situation in mind when drafting this statute, he argued: "New situa-
tions demand new rules. We have the text of the statute before us and
the courts have the privilege and the duty to adapt it to changes in the
social situation."'198
To narrow the gap still further, a constant flow of decisions has
treated a professional seller as a seller with knowledge,190 and, most
importantly, the famous maxim unus quisque peritus esse debet artis
suae,200 which forms the basis of this development, has been applied to
manufacturers and dealers alike, including retailers.201 Since, according
to prevailing view, the maxim creates an irrebuttable (?) presumption,2 02
French law has approached, if not reached, strict liability and has made
as has our law, a distinction between professional and non-professional
sellers.203 Furthermore, French law, in another striking parallel with
our law of strict liability,20 4 does not permit the professional seller to
insulate himself by exculpation clauses. 205 Finally, no distinction is
made between defects caused by faulty design and those caused by mis-
carriage of the manufacturing process.206
Given this background of the seller's responsibility for defective
quality, the injured consumer has typically sued his immediate seller,
who has sued his seller in turn, until finally the manufacturer was
197. Soc. des automobiles Rolland-Pilain v. Berchet, [1926] D.P. I. 9 (Cass. req.).
198. Id. at 12 (rapport de M. le couseiller CUlice).
199. E.g., Perret v. Clment et Monnier, [1894] D.P. II. 573 (Cour d'appel, Bourgcs),
aff'd, [1895] S. Jur. I. 271 (Cass. req.). In a parallel case, the German Bundesgerichtshof
denied liability of the bicycle dealer. See note 162 and accompanying text supra.
200. Soc. des automobiles Rolland-Pilain v. Berchet, [1926] D.P. 1. 9 (Cass. req.) (note of
L. Sosserand); 10 PLANIOL-RIPERT-HAmEL, supra note 194, No. 134; R.J. PorislE, TRA1TI
DU CONTRAT DE VENTE § 213 (1806).
201. Pernet v. Clement et Monnier, [1894] D.P. II. 573 (Cour d'appel, Bourges), aft'd,
[1895] S. Jur. I. 271 (Cass. req.); for a collection of opinions disregarding the principle,
see FicKTE, supra note 195, at 3842.
202. See Gaz et Electricit6 de France v. Etablissements Jacob Holtzer et Veuve Albert,
[1954] Sem. Jur. II. 8565 (Cass. civ. Ire). But see the case law collected in Fcrit, supra
note 195, at 37-38; Mazeaud, La Responsabilitd, supra note 194, at 616-17.
203. RESrATEmENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
204. 1d., comment m.
205. Chamay v. Soci&6 anonyme Mathis et Chaurand, [1937] D.H. Jur. 475 (Trib. dv.
de Draguignan), aff'd, [1937] D.H. Jur. 475 (Cour d'appel, Aix); FicEra, supra note 195,
at 32, 67-73.
206. Wallut v. Rouzaud, [1912] D.P. I. 16 (Cass. req.). An elaborate network of
duties imposed upon the seller to give directions and warnings has fortified the position
of the consumer still further. E.g., Judgment of April 30, 1957, [1957] D. jur. 550 (Cour
d'appel, Paris); Marcel et Julien v. 8oci&t6 Mousavon-Or~al et 6poux Rosiner, [1955] D.
Jur. 96 (Cour d'appel, Paris).
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reached.2 07 French law of civil procedure permits the defendant seller
at any time during the pendency of the lawsuit before the court of first
instance to implead his seller with the help of a so-called "appel en
garantie."20 8 With the help of this device the liability of the initial
seller is directly extended to the last buyer.-°
Instead of suing his own seller, the consumer is entitled to sue the
so-called "vendeur primitif" directly in contract.210 This action directe
anchored in venerable tradition,21' is based on the notion that a seller
in reselling a commodity impliedly assigns to his buyer all the rights
he has against his predecessor by virtue of the ownership of the com-
modity.2 12 It appears that the action directe is rarely used today: its
value is reduced by the requirement of a "brief delay,"213 and impleader
is generally sufficient to reach the initial seller.
Tort Liability. The main function of tort law is to protect persons
outside the distributive chain. But tort liability presupposes fault.
214
Such high standards of care are required, however, where the tortfeasor
is a professional, that tort liability approximates strict liability.21 And
case law has developed a provision of the Civil Code210 which makes
the "guardian of a thing" strictly liable for damages caused by its
defective qualities.21 7 The "guardian" who is liable will in turn seek
207. Wallut v. Rouzaud, [1912] D.P. I. 16 (Cass. rcq.); 10 PLANIoL-RPRir-HAmEL,
supra note 194, Nos. 1, 38.
208. C. PRo. Crv. art. 183. The code does not contain detailed provisions about implcad-
ing. The gaps have been filled by case law which permits impleader whenever the defen.
dant's liability is based on facts which would make the party impleaded liable to claim for
reimbursement. In the field of products liability this is the case when the defect which
forms the basis of the main suit was already present at the time the first sale had taken
place. 1 E. GLAssON & A. TissER, TRArn THioRQUE r PRATIQUE DO'RG. ISATION JtDICLAUE,
DE coMP ErENcE Er DE PFoCfaURE civn.E Nos. 252-57 (3d ed. 1925).
209. 10 PLANioL-RiPERT-HA :L, supra note 194, No. 138.
210. FicKEm, supra note 195, at 118-37; M. SoLus, L'AcnoN OIOEPr E L'lrr l- rd.TATzo
DES ARTICLE 1753, 1798, 199I DU CODE CIvIL (1914); NVAIIL, supra note 2.
211. Compagnie mdtallurgique et charbonniire belge v. Chemin de fer du nord, [18&I]
D.P. I. 357, [1886] S. Jur. . 149 (Cass. civ.); 5 C. AuBRa & G. RAu, CouRs nE Drorr cuat.
FRAI'IAIs § 355 bis (6th ed. 1946).
212. C. Crv. art. 1615.
213. The determination whether the requirement of a "brief delay" has been complied
with is within the discretion of the trial court. Compagnie mdtallurgique et charbonnire
belge v. Chemin de fer du nord, [1885] D.P. I. 357, [1886] S. Jur. I. 149 (Cass. civ.) (uge
du fait); C. Cirv. art. 1648.
214. For the availability of a tort remedy in lieu of or cumulatively with a contractual
claim, see 2 COLiN-CAPrrANT, supra note 191, No. 1272; 1 mLzn.uD-Tue, supra note 19.,
No. 173; 1 R. SAVATIER, TRArr DE LA, RESPONSABILITfi CIVILE EN DROrr FRANqis civIL, AD-
SuNInSRATIF, PROFESSIONNEL, PROCIDURAL Nos. 148-60 (2d ed. 1951).
215. The liability of an employer for torts of his servants (prdpos) under the Civil
Code corresponds to our law. C. Crv. art. 1384.
216. C. Crv. art. 1384, para. 1.
217. Id. Judgment of June 26, 1953, [1954] S. Jur. L 41 (Cass. civ. 2e) (with note by H.
Mazeaud). See also Esmein, Le Diable dans la bouteilc, [1954] Sem. Jur. . 1163. The de-
fendant who had, at a lottery conducted at a fair, won a bottle of Bordeaux, "Appellation
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reimbursement from his contractual predecessor until finally the manu-
facturer is reached.
Public Policy
The victory of the fault principle over strict liability, which, due to
the influence of Roman law, occurred earlier in the civil than in the
common law, was justly hailed as a great advance in the history of tort
law. It meant a significant increase in man's freedom of action without
sacrificing the great goal of tort law: minimization of accident costs.
The establishment of the fault requirement freed enterprises from the
stifling costs of non-fault accidents which were an inevitable accompani-
ment of the rapid growth of industry. Strict liability, we are told by
our case law of that period, would "deprive our land of the benefits and
promises of industrial expansion." 21 Similar arguments were made in
civil law countries.21
Accidents not negligently caused, according to classical theory, are an
inevitable part of the risk of living and have to be borne by the victim. 2 0
It is up to each individual to minimize the risk inherent in the use of
goods by careful shopping for the safest possible product and by taking
out insurance against inevitable risks. Informed market choices will,
in the long run, put pressure on enterprises steadily to improve their
product and will tend to eliminate unsafe products.2 21
However convincing these arguments were to preceding generations,
they have begun to lose their appeal within the last decades.2 "2 Even in
Germany, exceptions have been grafted upon the negligence require-
ment. 223 Enhanced social concern for and awareness of the plight of
controlld," served a glass of the wine to a friend. The latter died of internal burns because
the bottle contained a corrosive substance. The donor was held liable as guardian. He in
turn had a claim over in contract against the conductor of the lottery,
218. Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution, supra note 9, at 516; see Losec v.
Buchanan, 51 N.Y. 476, 484-85 (1873): "We must have factories, machinery, dams, canals
and railroads. They are demanded by the manifold wants of mankind, and lay [sic] at the
basis of all our civilization. If I have any of these upon my lands, and they are not a
nuisance and are not so managed as to become such, I am not responsible for any damage
they accidentally and unavoidably do my neighbor. He receives his compensation for such
damage by the general good, in which he shares, and the right which he has to place the
same things upon his lands."s
219. See generally EssER, GRUNDLAGEN & ENTw1CKLUNO, supra note 140, §§ 4.6; SuIrrIS,
supra note 7, at 80-81.
220. BLum & KALvEN, supra note 76, at 61 and passim; EssEa, GRUWDLAOEN & ENTWICX-
LUNG, supra note 140.
221. Speidel, supra note 78, at 810.
222. Public sentiment in favor of strict liability proved stronger than the counsel of
those who argued that imposition of strict liability would impede progress.
223. See notes 140, 160 and accompanying text supra.
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the victim has led to a dilution of negligence and by almost impercept-
ible steps to the emergence of strict liability. Social welfare, it is now
said, cannot be measured in terms of private returns and outlays only;
"disservices" caused by productive activities have to be taken into ac-
count.224 An industry not charged for the social cost of non-fault acci-
dents caused by its defective products receives a subsidy from its victims
while the buyer of a product will not pay for its "true" costs. -2 A
misallocation of resources will follow.20
Ideas derived from welfare economics thus directly or indirectly
exercised a significant influence on the law of products liability, partic-
ularly in this country. They have led to the conviction, not always
clearly articulated, that, irrespective of the victim,2 2 T all injuries caused
by defective products should be treated as social and not as private
costs.2 2 Thus economic reasons support a defence of strict liability in
terms of fairness-an equitable distribution of losses.2- 3
Since our impressive literature on the policy goals of strict liability
seems to have no counterpart in civil law countries, the discussion which
follows will mainly rely on American sources.
Some of the reasons for the shift in public philosophy in our country
are conveniently summarized in a comment 0 to section 402A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts which reads as follows:
On whatever theory, the justification for the strict liability has
been said to be that the seller, by marketing his product for use and
consumption, has undertaken and assumed a special responsibility
toward any member of the consuming public who may be injured
by it; that the public has the right to and does expect, in the case
of products which it needs and for which it is forced to rely upon
the seller, that reputable sellers will stand behind their goods; that
public policy demands that the burden of accidental injuries caused
by products intended for consumption be placed upon those who
market them, and be treated as a cost of production against which
224. K. KAPP, TnE SociAL Cosrs OF PRivATE EhurmrEus 1-25 (1950); A. Picou, TiE
EcoNoMICS oF WELFARE ch. IX, §§ 10-14 (4th ed. 1938); Coase, The Problem of Social Cost,
3 J. Lw & EcoN. 1, 28-44 (1960).
225. Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution, supra note 9, at 531.
226. Id. at 530.
227. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A applies to consumers and users, irrespec-
tive of whether or not they are buyers. There is even some tendency to protect the by-
stander by strict liability. Note, Strict Products Liability and the Bystandcr, 64 CoLUu.
L. REv. 916 (1964). But see Mull v. Ford Motor Co., CCH PRODuCTS LniLirx REP'. Cj5647
(2d Cir. 1966).
228. According to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 402A, comment m, no dis-
daimer is permitted even between the parties in a bargaining situation. For a recent
discussion of the dichotomy between social and private costs, see Coase, supra note 224.
229. 14 DE PAUL U.L. REv. 488 (1965).
,30. RESTATEMNT (SECOND) OF TomS § 402A, comment c (1965).
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liability insurance can be obtained; and that the consumer of such
products is entitled to the maximum of protection at the hands of
someone, and the proper persons to afford it are those who market
the products.
The comment in justifying the rule does not talk only in vague
generalities. Realistically, it stresses the effects of modem merchandising
and mass advertising and the justifiable understanding of consumers
and users.231 When the manufacturer-seller holds himself out as an
expert, it is not unfair to take him at his word and to treat him as such.
In the language of the French literature, unus quisque peritus esse debet
artis suae.23 2 To be sure, consumers as a class are not unaware of the
existence of defective goods, but however much any known history of
bad accidents may adversely affect the choice of "accident prone"
products, marketing techniques attempt, on the whole successfully, to
make sure that fear of accidents does not influence consumer choice.233
The comment speaks of products which the public needs and for
which it is "forced to rely on the seller." 234 This awkward phrase is not
meant to refer to a seller who enjoys a monopoly but rather to the
imbalance of expertise between seller and consumer.235 This imbalance
is due to factors such as the consumer's lack of technical knowledge,
his inability to evaluate the quality of many goods, and his lack of
opportunity to inspect due the rapid flow of goods. Most importantly,
a defect frequently manifests itself only by use. 236 The manufacturer,
by contrast, is or should be much better able to judge the quality of
the items which he produces and the statistical probability of a de-
fect.23
7
Liability, according to the comment, does not unfairly burden the
manufacturer. "[P]ublic policy demands that the burden of accident
injuries [should] be treated as a cost of production against which
liability insurance can be obtained." 23 No explanation, economic or
otherwise, is given for making all accident costs enterprise costs by
231. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 379, 161 A.2d 69, 80 (1960);
SiirrzS, supra note 7, at 38.
232. See note 200 and accompanying text supra.
233. See, e.g., Love v. Wolf, 226 Cal. App. 2d 378, 389, 38 Cal. Rptr. 183, 189 (1964);
Speidel, supra note 78, at 811.
234. RESTATEMIENT (SECOND) o TORTS § 402A, comment c (1965).
235. Speidel, supra note 78, at 811.
236. Note, Disclaimers of Warranty in Consumer Sales, 77 HARV. L. Rv, 318, 327-28
(1963).
237. "In effect, the ordinary contracts of sale are contracts of adhesion, presented to
consumers under conditions of haste, ignorance, and compulsion." Id. at 328.
238. RSTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment c (1965).
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judicial fiat.2 9 To find a justification, we have to go back to tie classic
statement on strict products liability: the concurring opinion of Justice
Traynor (as he then was) in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Company.- 0
Even if there is no negligence, public policy demands that re-
sponsibility be fixed wherever it will most effectively reduce the
hazards to life and health inherent in defective products that reach
the market. It is evident that the manufacturer can anticipate some
hazards and guard against the recurrence of others, as the public
cannot. Those who suffer injury from defective products are un-
prepared to meet its consequences. The cost of an injury and the
loss of time or health may be an overwhelming misfortune to the
person injured, and a needless one, for the risk of injury can be
insured by the manufacturer and distributed among the public as
a cost of doing business. It is to the public interest to discourage
the marketing of products having defects that are a menace to the
public. If such products nevertheless find their way into the market
it is to the public interest to place the responsibility for whatever
injury they may cause upon the manufacturer, who, even if he is
not negligent in the manufacture of the product, is responsible for
its reaching the market. However intermittently such injuries may
occur and however haphazardly they may strike, the risk of their
occurrence is a constant risk and a general one. Against such a risk
there should be general and constant protection and the manu-
facturer is best situated to afford such protection.
Products liability, according to Justice Traynor, now attempts to
achieve not only compensation and deterrence, but also the proper
allocation of resources. 241 The manufacturer can either control the
risk of defective products or can equitably distribute losses among all
potential victims. He is strategically located to act not only as risk
gatherer but also as risk distributor. Strict liability, therefore, is a
good deal fairer than letting fate select the victim at random and
letting him bear the full loss by denying him compensation; the seller
by raising his price, spreads the loss over the community of consumers.
The price paid by each consumer contains a small premium for acci-
dent insurance.24 To be sure he is forced to take out insurance with the
seller but this compulsory form of insurance is more efficient than for
239. "[Tjhe allocation of costs is always avowedly instrumental. Only if we specify
the goals can the economist tell us what is the proper allocation of costs." BLumS & KAxxeTN,
supra note 76, at 57.
240. 24 CaL 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 440-41 (1944).
241. See generally Calabresi, Fault, Accidents and the Wonderful World of Blum and
Kalven, 75 YALE UJ. 216, 223-25 (1965); Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution,
supra note 9, at 500-17.
242. BLUbi & KALVEN, supra note 76, at 59. The same arguments have been advanced in
the German literature. E.g., ADoLs, supra note 21, at 216-17.
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each individual to take out his own insurance policy. 243 The compulsory
nature of this state of affairs seems less strange when we remember that
the mechanism of risk distribution employed under strict liability is
not fundamentally different from that existing under the fault system.
Here, too, a premium appears in the price of the merchandise to protect
the manufacturer against the consequences of fault liability. 44 To be
sure, there may be a conflict between the principles of risk bearing and
risk distribution.245 The enterpriser, due to market conditions, may
not be able to shift to his customers the cost of accidents and accident
insurance. 24 6 But accident costs or premiums are not different from
other costs. Should an enterprise, due to market conditions, be forced
out of business because its accident rate, reflected in its prices, makes
its products non-competitive, its resources will be available for other
endeavors so that in net effect, the nation's resources will be better
allocated in terms of consumer preferences.
247
Defect Revisited. Imposition of strict liability has been criticized be-
cause it may lead to runaway social engineering. Courts, we are told,
are ill equipped to discharge their task of administering strict liability
since an adversary proceeding does not lend itself to investigation of
the social and economic implications and ramifications of strict liabil.
ity.248 Responding to this charge, the advocates of strict liability point
out that it does not amount to unlimited liability.249 In the language of
a recent case, "it may fairly be said that the liability which [strict
243. Calabresi, Fault & Accidents, supra note 241, at 225. One large insurance policy Is
cheaper than a great number of small policies.
244. Ehrenzweig, Assurance Oblige-A Comparative Study, 15 LAW & CONTEAMP. Raon.
445, 446 (1950); Calabresi, supra note 241, at 229-31.
245. Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution, supra note 9, at 519-24; Morris,
Enterprise Liability and the Actuarial Process-The Insignificance of Foresight, 70 YALE
L.J. 554,585 (1961), Plant, supra note 76, at 946.
246. To the extent that today competition is competition in research, big business has
a decided advantage over small business. Sxmnxs, supra note 7, at 56-58.
247. The dire predictions with regard to the future of Cutter Laboratories resulting
from the substantial number of claims against it, 13 STAN. L. Rav. 645, 648 (1961), have
not materialized.
248. Cochran v. Brooke, 409 P.2d 904, 907 (Ore. 1966): "It is, indeed, easy for compassion
to dictate an absolute liability against the makers of a product that can cause blindness.
But once the liability is imposed, it could not be judicially limited only to cases involving
disastrous consequences. An upset stomach caused by taking aspirin would, as well, entitle
the user to his measure of damages. We can agree with the plaintiff that social justice
might require that the price of the drugs should include an amount sufficient to create
a fund to compensate those who suffer unanticipated harm from the use of a beneficial
drug. But this kind of a system of compensation is beyond the power of a court to im-
pose." See also Connolly, The Liability of a Manufacturer for Unknowable Hazards In-
herent in his Product, 32 INS. COUNSE.L J. 303, 306 (1965).
249. "By and large, the standard of safety of the goods is the same under the warranty
theory as under the negligence theory." Lartigue v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 317 F.2d
19, 37 (5th Cir. 1963).
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liability] imposes is hardly more than what exists under implied war-
ranty when stripped of contract doctrine of privity, disclaimer, require-
ment of notice of defect and limitations through inconsistencies of
express warranties." 250 The identification of "unreasonably dangerous"
with unmerchantable products might stifle the evolution of products
liability, unless we constantly keep in mind that merchantability is a
highly flexible concept, capable of expansion.25 To be sure, strict
liability does not commit us to saying that products must be incapable
of doing harm, must measure up to absolute perfection or not wear
out.252 They should be regarded as not defective so long as they are
"safe for normal handling and consumption;"2 13 otherwise their cost
would be prohibitive. In the language of a comment to section 402A
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, a product is defective only when
it does not measure up to the quality "contemplated by the ordinary
consumer who purchases it with the ordinary knowledge common to
the community as to its character."254 We are also not committed to
holding tobacco products unreasonably dangerous; in view of the now
patent risks of smoking, liability should not be imposed in favor of the
smoker who contracts cancer, except in cases of misleading advertis-
ing.255
But the case law should keep up with the progress of technology, the
legitimate expectations of society, and its changing notions of justice.-""
250. Greeno v. Clark Equip. Co., 237 F. Supp. 427,429 (N.D. Ind. 1955).
251. But see Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Lia-
bility, 32 TENN. L. Rv. 363, 365 (1965).
It goes without saying that not all unmerchantable products are unreasonably dangerous.
In some consumer products liability cases, warranties of merchantability and of fitness
will be synonymous. Ryan v. Progressive Grocery Stores, Inc, 255 N.Y. 388, 392, 175 N.E.
105, 106 (1931).
252. Lartigue v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 317 F.2d 19, 37 (5th Cir. 1963); Jacubowslk
v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg., 42 N.J. 177, 185, 199 A.2d 826, 831 (1965); Courtois v. General
Motors Corp., 37 N.J. 525, 543, 182 A.2d 545, 554 (1962); Wade, supra note 75, at 16.
The consumer will spend so much on safety as to make increases in safety equal to
savings on accidents.
253. RESTATEMiENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment h (1955). For a liberal interpre-
tation of "normal handling," see Hardman v. Helene Curtis Indus., Inc., 48 InI. App. 2d
42, 198 N.E.2d 681 (1964). But see Drummond v. General Motors Corp., 35 U.S.L.W. 2119
(Cal. Super. Ct. LA. Cty. 1966).
254. Id.
255. See id. This should be true, even if we regard the use of tobacco as habit forming.
But see James, The Untoward Effects of Cigarettes and Drugs: Some Reflections on
Enterprise Liability, 54 CA~r. L. rv. 1550 (1966); Traynor, supra note 25l, at 371.
256. See Santor v. A 9- M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 67, 207 A.2d 805, 312-13
(1965).
For a list of factors to be considered, see Wade, supra note 75, at 17. He suggests to take
into consideration: "(1) the usefulness and desirability of the product, (2) the availabil-
ity of other and safer products to meet the same need, (3) the likelihood of injury and its
probable seriousness, (4) the obviousness of the danger, (5) common knowledge and normal
public expectation of the danger (particularly for established products), (6) the avoidability
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Defect must remain an accordion-like, open-ended term. The faulty
design concept, to give an example, is quite capable of expansion in
accordance with stricter notions of safety. Case law should be able to
require, for instance, even more safety features in cars, particularly
when the courts can borrow from and supplement standards set up
under federal legislation.257 In the field of drug marketing, defining
the outer limits of strict liability presents us with most difficult ques-
tions of policy. Should drug companies not bear liability for harm
that no "developed human skill or foresight" could anticipate?08 This
position has been thoughtfully defended since only calculable risks lend
themselves to the principle of insurance and risk spreading.20 But im-
position of liability for "unknowable" side effects of a drug may be re-
garded as socially desirable even under risk spreading so long as the
injury can be called, in the language of Ehrenzweig, a loss "typically"
caused by the industry.260 Still, the history of vaccination against rabies
and smallpox should make us aware that there are inevitably unsafe
products whose benefits far outweigh their dangers.201 Consumers for a
of injury by care in the use of the product (including the effect of instructions or warn-
ings), and (7) the ability to eliminate the danger without seriously impairing the usefulness
of the product or making it unduly expensive."
A difficult question of policy is raised when we ask ourselves to what extent a warning
should be permitted to dispense with the need for improving the safety of the product.
A warning should not be permitted to dispense with the duty to provide adequate safe-
guards, at least if this can be done without incurring prohibitive costs. Schipper v.
Levitt & Sons, 44 NJ. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965); Note, Products Liability and Section 402A
of the Restatement of Torts, 55 GEo. L.J. 286, 305-08 (1966).
257. National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-563, 80 Stat. 718,
On seat belt legislation, see 14 DE PAUL L. Rv. 152 (1964).
The reluctance of courts on this score is illustrated by, e.g., Evans v. General Motors
Corp., 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1966): the case involved a 1961 Chevrolet equipped with an X
frame, which allegedly permitted the side of the automobile to collapse against driver
inflicting fatal injuries when the automobile was struck broadside by another car. Accord-
ing to the majority opinion the defendant had no duty to equip all its automobiles with
side rail perimeter frames, nor can such duty be inferred from the mere fact that some
of the defendant's or some of its competitors' automobiles are made with side rails, or
from the opinions of certain experts that perimeter frames are safer in a collision. For
a borderline case, see Brown v. General Motors Corp., 355 F.2d 814 (4th Cir. 1966).
258. Ross v. Philip Morris & Co., 328 F.2d 3 (8th Cir. 1964); Lartigue v. R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co., 317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir. 1963).
This philosophy may explain case law which denies liability for uniquely personal
disasters due, for instance, to a rare allergy. Gran v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 324 F,2d 309
(5th Cir. 1963); Lewis v. Baker, 413 P.2d 400 (Ore. 1966); Cochran v. Brooke, 409 P.2d 904
(Ore. 1966). According to the Restatement the manufacturer is under a duty to exercise
due diligence to discover whether or not an allergic class may exist and to attach a clear
warning in cases where the manufacturer knows or reasonably should know of such
class (comment 1). For an author favoring broader liability see James, Untoward Effects,
supra note. 255, at 1555-56. See generally Rheingold, supra note 80.
259. Lorenz, Ldnderbericht, supra note 159, at 53; Connolly, supra note 248.
260. A. EHRENzwEIG, NEGLIGENCE wrTHOUT FAULT 81 (1951); James, Untoward Effects,
supra note 255.
261. Carmen v. Eli Lilly & Co., 109 Ind. App. 76, 84, 32 N.E.2d 729, 731 (1941); RE-
STATemENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment k (1965); G. WILLAMS, VIRUs HUNTERS 27
(1959). See also Perlmutter v. Beth David Hosp., 308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792 (1954).
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long time have lived with and accepted the risks inherent in their use.
It makes eminent good sense to follow the Restatement and not to call
these products unreasonably dangerous provided their distribution is
accompanied by adequate warning.20 2 The Restatement, however, sig-
nificantly adds:
The same is true of many other drugs, vaccines, and the like, many
of which for this very reason cannot legally be sold except to
physicians, or under the prescription of a physician. It is also true
in particular of many new or experimental drugs as to which, be-
cause of lack of time and opportunity for sufficient medical ex-
perience, there can be no assurance of safety, or perhaps even of
purity of ingredients, but such experience as there is justifies the
marketing and use of the drug notwithstanding a medically recog-
nizable risk. The seller of such products, again with the qualifica-
tion that they are properly prepared and marketed, and proper
warning is given, where the situation calls for it, is not to be held
to strict liability for unfortunate consequences attending their use,
merely because he has undertaken to supply the public with an
apparently useful and desirable product, attended with a known
but apparently reasonable risk.
One can agree with the Restatement that an experimental drug is not
unreasonably dangerous per se. Sufficient user experience is indispens-
able to research and making the supplier a guarantor of safety without
such research may be regarded as too burdensome. But it should be
emphasized that the exception from liability presupposes proper prep-
aration and marketing with proper warning. The courts in giving
meaning to these requirements should not be bound by the guidelines
set up in FDA regulations.2 63 These regulations setting up minimum
standards are not even foolproof for "established" drugs, -04 let alone ex-
perimental drugs. 65 A thoughtful comment,001 has suggested that a ser-
262. RE rATmENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 402A, comment h (1965).
263. Comment, Strict Liability for Drug Manufacturers: Public Policy Misconceived,
13 STAN. L. REv. 645, 651 (1961).
264. Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act § 505(a), (b), 21 U.S.C. § 355(a), (b) (1964).
Section 505(d) sets forth the grounds upon which the Secretary may refuse to approve
the application. 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (1964).
265. Gottsdanker v. Cutter Laboratories, Inc., 182 Cal. App. 2d 602, 6 Cal. Rptr. 320
(1960) (the standardized precautionary measures were found inadequate only after the
Cutter vaccine was withdrawn from the market); Comment, Strict Liability for Drug
Manufacturers, supra note 263, at 647. Contra, Lewis v. Baker, 413 P.2d 400 (Ore. 1966):
manufacturer of MER/29, a prescription drug, held not liable in breach of warranty for
alleged side effects of drug, since the drug had been approved by the FDA, was properly
tested, labeled with proper warning, and there was no evidence of fraud or culpable non-
disclaimer in obtaining or retaining FDA approval. Prior to final approval a drug is
called experimental, after approval it is called established.
266. Comment, The Manufacture, Testing and Distribution of Harmful New Drugs:
The Application of Strict Liability, 28 U. Prrr. L. REv. 37, 46 (1960).
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viceable set of guidelines is furnished by the Nuremberg Code of Ethics
in Medical Research 26 7 and has advocated that the defendant should be
required to prove that he has fully complied with its principles.
Assumption of Risk. The possible tension between the tort approach
to disclaimers followed in the Restatement and the contract road used
by the Uniform Commercial Code2 8 raises a fundamental question
as to the proper role of disclaimers in a system of enterprise liability.
At first glance, all the arguments in favor of strict liability appear to
militate against permitting disclaimers. Strict liability, in fact, was
invented as a reaction not only against the defense of privity but also
against obnoxious disclaimers.26 9 And yet, it is hard to see why enter-
prise liability should not be reconcilable with honoring "informed
choice."270 Even the Restatement, which denies effectiveness to dis-
claimers, permits the defense of voluntary assumption of risk. 271 Indeed,
there seems to be no reason why seller and buyer should not be free to
bargain about the allocation of risks. The sale of experimental prod-
ucts in a commercial setting immediately comes to mind.
272
It is very tempting to draw the line between what is permissible and
what is not by differentiating between commercial and consumer sales.
Consumer sales are typically characterized by absence of bargaining.
The need for rapid flow of consumer goods makes dickering about
quality and disclaimer with its attendant costs unrealistic. Still, drawing
a hard and fast line between consumer and non-consumer sales seems
undesirable. It is enough to restrict disclaimers to situations when it
can be reasonably said that the consumer has freely assumed the risk.
27 3
An attempt to draw the line between physical and commercial
losses274 is equally unpersuasive. Take the sale of a secondhand car, for
instance, where the buyer was injured because the brakes were defec-
tive. Assuming that sales of secondhand goods are covered by the Re-
statement rule, there seems to be no need for protecting the buyer pro-
267. Though drafted to aid in the Nuremburg trials of Nazi war criminals, they have
had a strong influence on subsequent ethical codes. The Comment cited supra note 266
gives the text of the code, at 46-56.
268. See text at note 106 supra.
269. Shanker, supra note 69, at 19.
270. Mansfield, Informed Choice in the Law of Torts, 22 LA. L. Ruv. 17 (1961).
271. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 402A, comment n (1965); see PRossSER ON Toazs
461.
272. Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 28 n.7, 403 P.2d 145, 158 n.7, 45 Cal. Rptr.
17, 30 n.7 (1965) (concurring and dissenting opinion of Peters, J.); see note 108 supra, See
also Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution, supra note 9.
273. Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 29, 403 P.2d 145, 158, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 30
(1965) (concurring and dissenting opinion of Peters, J.).
274. Id. at 15-16, 403 P.2d at 149-50, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 21-22.
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vided he is given full information.2 5 Voluntary assumption of risk
without express disclaimer276 should equally be available as a defense
to the seller of a new product if the buyer was fully aware of the danger
attendant to the use of product, provided the product is not "essential
to a basic standard of living." 27 7 This is one of the lessons to be gained
from Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors Incorporated.-8 On the other
hand, a buyer who has the choice between two products, one subject, the
other not subject, to disclaimer is not in need of protection if he is in-
jured, provided the disclaimer is clear enough.- 0 The same is true for
the availability of the defense of voluntary assumption of risk. A buyer
who refuses, for instance, an optional safety belt should not be heard if
he complains that he was thrown against the windshield.
This leads us to an intriguing speculation: should disclaimers be
permitted if they are paid for by price differentials? It is well known
that many a commodity is sold with warranties of different duration;
automobiles are sold with different optional safety features.2 0 The
existing variations in warranties and safety features are reflected in
different prices. Should sellers be permitted to apply this technique
of differentiation to disclaimers generally and to give the buyers an
option to buy a product for a price without disclaimer, or at a reduced
price with disclaimer? Such a system might be feasible with regard to
commodities where records are kept of each individual seller's trans-
action, e.g., the sale of automobiles. But there seem to be unsurmount-
able obstacles to applying such a mixed system. The sale of dangerous
products does not fall into the bargaining pat.tem envisaged in Mr.
Coase's analysis: 21 it involves multiple parties. The seller cannot
predict who is going to be hurt by a defective product. It may be the
buyer, a member of the buyer's family, a companion who is given a ride
275. Pokrajac v. Wade Motors, Inc., 266 Wis. 398, 63 N.W.2d 720 (1954). Liability of a
third party despite disclaimer is another matter. Flies v. Fox Bros. Buick Co., 196 Wis. 196,
218 N.V. 855 (1928); see Browne v. Fanestra, Inc., 375 Mich. 566, 134 N.W2d 730 (1965).
276. Saeter v. Harley Davidson Motor Co., 186 Cal. App. 2d 248, 8 Cal. Rptr. 747 (1960).
hearing denied, 186 Cal. App. 2d 258; Webster v. Blue Ship Tea Room, Inc., 347 Mas.
421, 198 N.E.2d 209 (1964) (bone in fishchowder).
It is interesting that the defendant did not raise this defense in Green v. American
Tobacco Co., 154 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 1963). On the variant meanings of assumption of risk,
see Keeton, Assumption of Risk, supra note 114. To warrant a finding of assumption of
risk on the basis of disclaimer, the disclaimer must be specific.
277. Note, Disclaimers of Warranty in Consumer Sales, 77 HARv. L. R:v. 318, 332
(1963).
278. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
279. Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 28, 403 P.2d 145, 158, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 30
(1965) (concurring and dissenting opinion of Peters, J.).
280. Note, Unconscionable Business Contracts: A Doctrine Gone AwY,, 70 YAME L.J.
453, 457 (1961).
281. Coase, supra note 224.
933
The Yale Law Journal
or even a bystander (provided strict liability extends to the by-
stander).282 Realistically, therefore, the seller is unable to quote the
relevant prices. Even in the sale of cars, the system would work only if
buyers were required to take out insurance for the protection of third
parties.
Moreover, it may be difficult to determine whether a disclaimer was
really bargained for. It is easy to find a fair bargain where the customer
was offered identical cars with or without a safety belt. But a car manu-
facturer may not make a particular model with a collapsible steer-
ing column. A disclaimer should not be available against an injured
buyer of such a car with a non-collapsible column solely because he
could have bought another manufacturer's product which did contain
the safety feature. The two products might not have been close sub-
stitutes. In fact, in choosing the other car because it had a collapsible
steering column, the consumer might have had to accept some unre-
lated unsafe feature.
Should manufacturers of unavoidably unsafe products such as anti-
rabies vaccine be free from liability to knowing users?28 3 These prod-
ucts are sure to cause injury at present to some users, but continued
experimentation could lead to improvement. Use of the anti-rabies
drug is in one sense a risk of living, and to this extent there is no reason
to impose liability on the manufacturer. If we feel that injured users
should be compensated, the government should grant them awards.284
But to the extent that we feel that liability imposed on the manu-
facturer would deter experimentation, injured consumers are not
merely assuming a risk of living; they are assuming a cost of experi-
mentation and are thereby subsidizing all those who benefit by experi-
mentation and improvement. This community of beneficiaries includes
the entire public, both users and non-users of the unsafe products; there-
fore the government ought to subsidize the industry by compensating
the victims. But if the government refuses to subsidize the costs of
experimentation, then the companies should be liable to injured users;
they can pass the cost along to all drug users, and it is preferable that
this large group of beneficiaries bear the cost instead of the injured
victims.
The Dominant Party. The emergence of strict liability has invited
282. See note 227 supra.
283. See Carmen v. Eli Lilly & Co., 109 Ind. App. 76, 84, 32 N.E.2d 729, 731 (1941).
284. For a discussion of the various plans, see Rheingold, supra note 80, at 1014-16.
See also H.R. 8082, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957); Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 2, as amended,
42 U.S.C. § 2012(i) (1964).
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courts and literature to develop a workable theory for determining a
party best able to serve as risk gatherer and distributor. Recent case law
has shown the need for revising the standard answer that the loss
should be placed on the "dominant party."2 15 In Goldberg v. Kollsman
Instrument Corporation,286 for instance, the majority and minority
disagreed on this very issue. At stake was the liability of the air carrier,
of the assembler and of the manufacturer of a component part for the
death of an airplane passenger. The carrier having settled out of
court,287 the New York Court of Appeals had to deal only with the
liability of the assembler and the manufacturer of the allegedly defec-
tive altimeter. According to the majority of the court, the assembler
which put the completed aircraft into the market 88 should be regarded
as the dominant party. Since this gave passengers adequate protection,
the court felt it unnecessary "for the present at least" to extend enter-
prise liability to the co-defendant, the manufacturer of the component
part.289 But the dissenters, while considering the carrier to be dominant,
would have preferred to let the passengers bear the risk. They cited, in
support of this view, rigorous federal inspection, public awareness of
the risks involved and the availability of flight insurance. Liability, they
claimed, would not in this case "accord with the rationale upon which
the doctrine of strict liability rests."29 0
The purpose of such liability is not to regulate conduct with a
view to eliminating accidents, but rather to remove the economic
consequences of accidents from the victim who is unprepared to
bear them and place the risk on the enterprise in the course of
whose business they arise. The risk, it is said, becomes part of the
285. The expression was coined by the late dean of the Yale Law School, Harry
Shulman.
286. 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E2d 81, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1963). Plaintiff, administratrix
of the estate of her daughter killed in an airplane crash, brought an action for negligence
against American Airlines, Lockheed Aircraft Corporation (manufacturer and assembler)
and Kollsman, manufacturer of an allegedly defective altimeter, and for breach of an
implied warranty against Lockheed and Kollsman. The Appellate Division had affirmed the
trial court's dismissal of the warranty action. 12 App. Div. 2d 906, 214 N.Y.S.2d 6-10 (1961).
On appeal, held, affirmed as to Kollsman, and, in a four to three opinion, reversed as to
Lockhieed. Despite lack of privity, a warranty action by the ultimate user wiU lie against
the manufacturer of the completed product. The liability of American Airlines was not
before the Court of Appeals, plaintiff having settled for $16,000. Brief for Defendant
Kollsman at 9, Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E2d 81, 240
N.Y.S.2d 592 (1963). A different plaintiff involved in the same accident was awarded
$220,000. Lemach v. American Airlines, 16 App. Div. 2d 940, 229 N.YS.2d 721 (1962).
287. Brief for Defendant Kollsman at 9.
288. 12 N.Y.2d at 437, 191 N.E.2d at 82-83, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 594-95.
289. Id. It appears that the dissenters felt that Kollsman was not held liable because
it was not guilty of lack of due care.
290. Id. at 438-39, 191 N.E.2d at 83-84, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 595-96. Relying on the avail-
ability of flight insurance is utterly unrealistic in light of the high cost of flight insurance
to the individual passengers as contrasted with the company.
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cost of doing business and can be effectively distributed among
the public through insurance or by a direct reflection in the price
of the goods or service. As applied to this case we think the enter-
prise to which accidents such as the present are incident is the
carriage of passengers by air....
Whatever conclusions may flow from the fact that the accident
was caused by a defective altimeter should be merged in whatever
responsibility the law may place on the airline with which plaintiff
did business....
. . . [A]ny claim in respect of an airplane accident that is
grounded in strict enterprise liability should be fixed on the air-
line or none at all.
291
Since the imposition of strict liability on an airline would amount
to casting aside "well established law in deference to a theory of social
planning that is still much in dispute," re-evaluation of the liability of
the air carrier should be left to the legislature.
2 2
The search for a refined theory of dominance has reopened the issue
of the social desirability of holding the middleman strictly liable. The
case law has held him liable in order ultimately to reach the dominant
party; the doctrine may now no longer be necessary. This is particularly
true where the middleman has no means of discovering a defect. Should
a retailer of canned food, for instance, be held liable if a can is
spoiled,298 a retail druggist if a prescription drug turns out to have side
291. Id. at 440-41, 191 N.E.2d at 85-86, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 598-99.
292. The court said further: "Our reluctance to hold an air carrier to strict liability
for the inevitable toll of injury incident to its enterprise is only the counsel of prudence.
Aside from the responsibility imposed on us to be slow to cast aside well.established law
in deference to a theory of social planning that is still much in dispute (Prosser, Torts
[2d ed.], § 84; Patterson, The Apportionment of Business Risks through Legal Devices,
24 Colum. L. Rev. 335, 358; Pound, Introduction to the Philosophy of Law 100-10-4
[19541), there remains the inquiry whether the facts fit the theory. It is easy, in a com-
pletely free economy, to envision the unimpeded distribution of risk by an enterprise on
which it is imposed; but how well will such a scheme work in an industry which is cosely
regulated by Federal agencies? In consideration of international competition and other
factors weighed by those responsible for rate regulation, how likely is it that rate scales
will rise in reflection of increased liability? (See Pound, supra, pp. 102-103.) In turn,
how likely is it that the additional risk will be effectively distributed as a cost of doing
business? Such questions can be intelligently resolved only by analysis of facts and figures
compiled after hearings in which all interested groups have an opportunity to present
economic arguments. These matters, which are the factual cornerstones supporting the
theory adopted by the majority, aside from our view that they apply it to the wrong
enterprise, are classically within the special competence of the Legislature to ascertain.
For a court to assume them in order to support a theory that displaces much of the law
of negligence from its ancestral environment involves an omniscience not shared by us.
For a court to apply them, not to the enterprise with which plaintiff dealt and relied
upon, or to the enterprise which manufactured the alleged defective part, but to the
assembler of the aircraft used by the carrier, involves a principle of selection which Is
purely arbitrary." Id. at 442-43, 191 N.E.2d at 86-87, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 599-600.
293. See the attitude of the German Reichsgericht, note 164 supra.
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effects?29 "'Long-arm" statutes enlarging personal jurisdiction2 have
further reduced, it seems, the need for holding the retailer liable.
Nevertheless, it still has its most vocal defenders even today. In Mr.
Justice Traynor's words:2 910
Retailers like manufacturers are engaged in the business of dis-
tributing goods to the public. They are an integral part of the
overall producing and marketing enterprise that should bear the
cost of injuries resulting from defective products. In some cases
the retailer himself may play a substantial part in insuring that the
product is safe or may be in a position to exert pressure on the
manufacturer to that end. The retailer's strict liability thus serves
as an added incentive to safety. Strict liability on the manufacturer
and the retailer alike affords maximum protection to the injured
plaintiff and works no injustice to the defendants for they can
adjust the costs of such protection between them in the course of
their continuing business relationship.
And even the critics of the distributor's strict liability differentiate
between the small retailer and large enterprise which distributes the
products of small manufacturers whom it employs.20
Summary
In the field of products liability, common and civil law are not far
apart and the gap is constantly narrowing. However much they may
differ in details, all systems show a clear tendency to put the ultimate
burden of responsibility for harm done by defective products on the
enterprise to which the defect can be traced. To be sure, the technique
of achieving this result varies. Our law is increasingly making direct
recovery available against the enterprise responsible for the defect
irrespective of privity; other legal systems still appear to utilize to a
considerable extent the process of unraveling the chain of transactions
backward.
Most importantly, in imposing strict (enterprise) liability, our law
s not much out of line. A short recapitulation of fact situations which
ypically recur in the field of products liability will make this quite
lear. Adapting the classification recently used in a brilliant German
294. McLeod v. W.S. Mvferrel Co., 167 So. 2d 901 (Fla. Ct. App. 1964).
295. For their discussion, see F. JAms, Crwu Paoc:EuRE § 12.10 (1965).
N.6. Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 262-63, 391 P.2d 168, 171-72, 87
I. Rptr. 896, 899-900 (1964); Prosser, The Fall of The Citadel, supra note 59, at 816.
97. See Note, The Marketing Structure and Judicial Protection of the Consumer,
CoLum. L. Ray. 77 (1937).
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study,293 it may be said that the case law imposing enterprise liability
has dealt with the following categories: products which are dangerous,
either because of faulty design and composition or because of mis-
carriage of the manufacturing process, products not defective as such
but whose use may be unsafe without proper direction or warning,
products which are regarded as safe in terms of available knowledge
when they enter the stream of commerce but which turn out to be
harmful on the basis of subsequent scientific discovery, and finally
unavoidably unsafe products. Production and marketing of unavoid-
ably unsafe goods do not entail liability. The same, broadly speaking,
seems to be true for goods regarded as safe on the basis of all available
knowledge. In this area, however, it is quite possible that liability
might be expanded in a legal system subscribing to strict liability.
Furthermore, all legal systems have imposed elaborate duties to give
directions or warning to prevent unsafe use. Typically, they distinguish
roughly between fully obvious and latent defects, and fail to accord
protection against dangers generally known and appreciated, or known
to the injured consumer or user. Even with regard to the remaining
categories the fault principle has not stood much in the way of uniform
treatment. In French law, as we have seen, products liability of the
professional is based on negligence in name only; with the help of an
irrebuttable (?) presumption of fault strict liability is achieved. Even in
Germany, the fault requirement has suffered erosion: the marketing of
goods which are dangerous because of faulty design or composition
constitutes negligence per se, but German law still insists that liability
for goods which are defective because of a miscarriage of the manufac-
turing process presupposes negligence. But this exception to the general
attitude may well be on its way out. Strict liability is finding an
increasingly large number of advocates who only differ as to the method
of accomplishing it. The policy arguments advanced for strict liability
and the objections to strict liability closely resemble those advanced in
this country.
298. Lorenz, LUnderbericht, supra note 159, at 7-9.
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